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ABSTRACT
The purpose o f this dissertation is twofold: (i) to establish hypotheses relating 
financial liability to certain auditor behaviors discussed in the independence literature, 
(ii) to empirically validate that the presence o f these behaviors will increase auditor 
financial liability over the normal audit situation, and (iii) to attempt to explain the 
differences in subjects’ perceptions for each o f the behavioral scenarios studied.
A survey instrument was developed and administered to three groups o f 
subjects: an impaneled jury, bankers, and CPAs. The instrument contained a vignette 
describing an annual audit situation where the company filed for bankruptcy subsequent 
to the issuance o f the audited financial statements. The subjects were asked to respond 
to seven independent situations. The first was a normal audit in which only annual 
audit services were provided. The other scenarios involved behaviors that are 
perceived to impair auditor independence.
Using a single-factor repeated measures design, the results indicated that for 
each subject group there were statistically significant differences in the expected 
direction between the normal audit and some o f the behavioral scenarios. At least one 
group identified each behavioral scenario as increasing the auditor’s financial liability as 
a result o f that auditor-auditee relationship.
in
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A multiple regression analysis was performed for each of the audit situations to 
explain the differences in financial liability perceptions as a result o f subject group 
membership and demographic and socioeconomic variables. It was found that in the 
normal audit and five o f the she behavioral scenarios, bankers attributed greater auditor 
financial liability than did jurors and CPAs. The banker parameter estimate was 
positive and statistically significant. Only in the audit fees scenario did both bankers 
and jurors attribute greater auditor financial liability than did CPAs. Additional 
variables such as ethnic background, educational level, and the number o f auditing and 
accounting courses completed were also found to be significant in some o f the 
scenarios.
In contrast to prior research, the results o f this study indicate that jurors and 
CPAs have similar perceptions with respect to the financial liability of auditors. The 
expectation-performance gap appears to be between bankers and others, including the 
general public and financial statement preparers.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The accounting profession has been in the midst o f a litigation crisis for almost 
thirty years. Settlements, judgements and legal costs have had a significant impact on 
the competitive environment, eliminating some firms and placing others at risk. Just in 
the past few years the big six accounting firms have spent over $1 billion to settle or 
defend against government and private claims associated with the failure o f over 300 
savings and loan institutions (Bacon & Berton, 1992.) O f particular concern to the 
profession is the unpredictable results o f a trial by jury. In a case involving Standard 
Chartered and United Bank o f Arizona, Price Waterhouse was directed to pay a record 
$338 million to the plaintiffs (Berton & Adler, 1992). Based on the facts o f the case, 
business and legal experts expected the case to be dismissed. The jury perceived the 
auditors to have been negligent in spite o f a preponderance o f evidence to the contrary.
The professional image of certified public accountants (CPAs) has been 
tarnished, which may diminish the value of the attest function in the future. If public 
accounting is to survive as a profession, steps must be taken to reestablish the CPA as a 
credible, independent, objective evaluator o f financial transactions and reports.
1
i
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2Background o f the Study 
Research indicates that financial statement users and auditors have substantially 
different perceptions regarding the role o f the auditor. This difference is referred to as 
the audit expectation gap. There are several factors that cause the public's expectation 
to differ from the actual performance of auditors. In her model o f the audit 
expectation-performance gap, Porter (1993) separates these differences into two 
categories: those that are within the control o f the profession to correct - the 
“performance gap” and those that are not - the “reasonableness gap.”
The "reasonableness gap" reflects societal expectations that may not be 
reasonable in relation to the professional expertise o f auditors and the current structure 
o f the auditing process. The profession must communicate to financial statement users 
the purpose o f auditing and its limitations. The "reasonableness gap" can only be 
addressed by public education.
In attempting to address this portion o f the audit-expectation performance gap, 
the profession has modified the language in audit reports to reflea that management 
has primary responsibility for the preparation o f financial statements. Various forms of 
communication have been developed by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) in an attempt to influence and educate the public as to the 
purpose and limitations o f auditing as performed by certified public accountants 
The "performance gap" refleas the gap between the duties that can be 
reasonably expeaed o f auditors and the performance o f auditors as perceived by the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3public. Two deficiencies contribute to the performance gap: deficient standards and 
deficient performance.
Deficient standards cause a performance gap when there is a  difference between 
auditor responsibilities as promulgated by professional standards and the expectations 
o f financial statement users. The profession has made several attempts over the years 
to align professional standards more closely with public expectations. One o f the more 
comprehensive attempts was the AICPA's issuance of the so-called "expectations gap" 
statements on auditing standards (SAS). SAS Numbers S3 through 61 call for auditors 
to assume a more proactive role as a means o f responding to criticism lodged against 
the profession. These SASs expanded the auditors' duties and responsibilities for the 
pursuit and detection of errors and irregularities, including management fraud and 
illegal acts. Improving the congruency between promulgated standards and public 
expectations is expected to reduce the "deficient standards" component o f the audit 
expectation-performance gap.
Deficient performance is the difference between auditors' existing duties and the 
perceived performance o f auditors. This is the only area of the expectation gap that is 
within the personal control o f the auditor. Violations of any o f the ten generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) would constitute deficient performance. The 
second general standard regarding auditor independence appears to cause the greatest 
difficulty in determining whether the auditor's performance has been deficient. This 
study focuses on aspects of deficient performance that contribute to the audit 
expectation-performance gap.
i
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4Purpose o f and Need for the Study 
The credibility o f the financial reporting process is seriously impaired if auditors 
are perceived by financial statement users to lack independence with respect to their 
audit clients. The second general standard requires that the auditor be independent in 
fact and in appearance. The AICPA and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) have issued standards that define the factual situations where independence 
might be compromised. Questions o f fact cause fewer problems in interpretation than 
those regarding appearance. The question that must be asked, ‘I s  the auditor free from 
any obligation to or interest in the client, its management, or its owners" such that 
judicial partiality might be compromised (AICPA, 1995, v.l)? In factual situations this 
question can be directly addressed.
The question of independence in appearance relates to how others perceive the 
auditor/client relationship. There are standards that are designed to clarify the 
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. These standards are flexible 
and allow auditors to participate in activities that may infringe on their ability to 
maintain professional objectivity and independence. This is evidenced by the many 
judgements that have been made against CPA firms.
There are six auditor behaviors that appear to make a significant contribution to 
the audit expectation-performance gap: client advocacy, the provision o f management 
advisory services, the relative size o f the audit fee, client cross-hiring auditor personnel, 
co-contracting between auditor and client, and the failure o f auditors to discover and 
report management fraud.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In a speech at the AICPA's Twenty-first Annual National Conference on 
Current SEC Developments, Walter P. Schuetze, Chief Accountant o f the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, cited several examples o f auditor advocacy for 
"incredible" client accounting proposals (1994). Each case represented a clear 
violation of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and had no redeeming 
value in improving the usefulness o f the information contained in the financial 
statements. This was not a question of interpretation but rather an attempt to 
artificially improve the company's reported financial performance by attempting to 
stretch the interpretation o f GAAP. Auditors from highly respected firms were arguing 
for these incredible positions on their clients’ behalf. Schuetze expressed concern over 
the volume o f such proposals, stating that the attitude of professional auditors is cause 
for concern as it reflects a serious lack o f independence. Client advocacy in these 
situations is in direct conflict with the professional skepticism that should be exercised 
by auditors. The appearance o f independence is called into question when auditors 
become advocates for client accounting positions that are in conflict with GAAP.
There does not appear to be any research into the effects o f client advocacy on 
perceived independence in the literature. Advocating client accounting positions, 
especially those that might be considered extreme departures from GAAP, would seem 
to conflict with the independent mental attitude that requires a prudent degree of 
professional skepticism. This auditor behavior may prove to be instrumental in 
allocating blame to the auditor for subsequent business failures.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The provision of management advisory services (MAS) to audit clients has been 
a hotly debated issue for a number o f years. MAS engagements span a wide range of 
service and consulting activities. Traditionally, audit firms have provided tax planning 
and compliance services to clients. As computer technology developed, accounting 
firms expanded consulting services to  include systems design, installation and software 
support services. Many firms have developed consulting specialties involving 
management, engineering, and other related business services. Each one o f these 
activities presents a  potential conflict o f interest between the MAS department and the 
audit department o f public accounting firms.
Hillison and Kennelley (1988) provide a thorough review o f the benefits and 
hazards associated with providing MAS services to audit clients. Congressional and 
regulatory criticisms are placing pressure on the profession to provide some form of 
self-regulation. Hillison and Kennelley identify six possible alternatives that range from 
complete prohibition to ignoring the problem. They suggest that at the very minimum, 
disclosure o f the MAS fees, as was required by ARS 250 (SEC, 1978) for a brief 
period o f time, would provide financial statement users with information on which to 
evaluate the independence of the auditor.
The relative importance o f a particular client to an accounting firm can create 
the appearance o f a lack of independence. Pany and Reckers (1980) studied this issue 
with respect to both the accounting firm and the audit engagement partner. The 
success o f a partner's career advancement could easily hinge on one or two relatively
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7substantial clients, even though the clients do not represent a significant portion o f the 
billings to the firm as a whole.
Public accounting firms have provided a source o f qualified, trained 
professional accountants to industry for many years. This practice has been called into 
question on the grounds that it has the potential o f impairing independence (Imhoff, 
1978). Auditors who anticipate leaving public accounting may have a less objective 
view o f client decisions if that client is a potential future employer. The relationship 
between an auditor-tumed-client accountant and the replacement auditor may also 
create an appearance of less than complete independence.
In recent years, accounting firms and their audit clients entered into joint 
ventures or co-contracting arrangements to provide computer hardware, software, and 
professional services (Lowe and Pany, 1994). The appearance o f independence is 
clearly brought into question under this type o f circumstance. Through regulation, the 
SEC severely restricted this type of accountant-client relationship in engagements 
involving publicly traded companies. Arthur Andersen was the first of the big six to 
circumvent this regulation by spinning off the consulting portion of the practice. It 
appears as though the other big six firms will pursue similar reorganization strategies if 
another alternative is not discovered. The problem o f appearance of independence 
therefore still remains and may become a more serious problem in the future.
One o f the major complaints lodged against auditors over the years has been 
their failure to discover fraud in the course of conducting an audit. The Senate 
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management o f the Senate Committee on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8Governmental Affairs (Metcalf Subcommittee) published a report in November, 1977, 
claiming that the accounting profession exhibited an “alarming lack o f independence 
and lack o f dedication to public protection” (as cited in Goldstein and Dixon, 1992). In 
the same year the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed by Congress, charging 
corporate management with responsibility for maintaining effective internal control 
systems. Management’s enhanced sensitivity to the proper functioning o f the internal 
control system eventually led to the adoption o f three additional Statements on 
Auditing Standards. These standards directed auditors to actively investigate and 
report on material weaknesses in internal control, errors and irregularities and illegal 
acts.
In 198S, John D. Dingell chaired the House Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, which held a series o f hearings on “the effectiveness o f independent 
accountants who audit publicly-owned corporations and the effectiveness o f the 
Securities and Exchange Commission which audits those accountants” (United States 
House o f Representatives, 1986). Again, the role of public accounting in protecting 
the integrity o f financial information in securities transactions was brought into 
question. “Where were the independent auditors?” was the battle cry from Congress as 
the public accountants lined up to explain or justify their performance (Goldstein & 
Dixon, 1992). The profession attempted to stress that primary responsibility for 
financial reporting rests with management. The auditing process does not guarantee 
that material misstatements will be eliminated, especially if management intends to 
deceive the auditors.
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9As with many of the issues related to the perception of auditor independence, 
the degree o f professional skepticism exercised by the auditor is difficult to observe. 
When fraud is committed by corporate management it is difficult for uninformed third 
parties to fathom how the auditors could have not known. Therefore, the only 
observable event that might provide some information would be the perception o f 
auditor performance after management fraud has been discovered and disclosed.
Research suggests that the more knowledge financial statement users have 
about accounting and auditing issues, the smaller the expectation-performance gap 
(Lowe and Pany, 1993). Even though the gap is smaller, there is normally a 
statistically significant difference in perceptions between sophisticated financial 
statement users and CPAs, indicating that the problem is not resolved by knowledge 
alone.
Selection o f Research Subjects
The majority o f research that has been conducted involved financial statement 
users and CPAs as subjects. The level o f sophistication of the financial statement users 
has covered a wide range. The CPAs have been separated into categories such as: 
public practice-large firm; public practice-smaller firm; and private industry. The 
insights derived from this level o f analysis have provided meaningful information 
regarding the differences in perceptions. Although financial statement users and CPAs 
are the primary participants in equity and credit transactions, they are not the ultimate 
decision makers in a litigation situation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Recent research has encompassed a broader range o f relevant subjects. Lowe 
and Pany (1993) and Lowe (1994) used a pool o f potential jurors as subjects. The 
perceptions o f this group was compared with that o f CPAs. The degree o f 
expectation-performance gap became much greater with subjects having little or no 
financial accounting background. In a comparable study, Anderson, Lowe, and 
Reckers (1993) used judges as subjects. This also provided a contrast much greater 
than when sophisticated financial statement users were involved. These differences 
suggest that a better model would include the ultimate decision makers—jurors.
In focusing on the expectation-performance gap construct developed by Porter 
(1993), this study utilizes hypothetical audit situations to examine the six auditor 
behaviors. The first five auditor behaviors can be observed directly. The last auditor 
behavior, failure to discover and disclose management fraud, is examined from the 
perspective o f a subsequent discovery. Rather than ascertaining the subjects’ 
perception o f the degree o f independence, this research focuses on whether the 
respondent would hold the auditor financially culpable for the subsequent business 
failure.
Client advocacy is an auditor behavior that has not been studied in the past.
The auditor behaviors most often studied in research on auditor independence are: the 
provision o f management advisory services to audit clients, the size o f the audit fee 
relative to the total billings responsibility of the partner-in-charge, clients’ cross-hiring 
of auditors, and co-contracting between auditor and audit client. The final attribute, 
the active search for and detection o f management fraud, is difficult to assess directly.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Therefore, this variable is examined through the observance o f the final outcome, 
subsequent discovery o f management fraud.
The survey instrument contains a brief vignette describing the client, industry, 
and management’s responsibility for the financial accounting system and reporting to 
third parties. The responsibility o f auditors to conduct the audit in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards and the significance o f an unqualified audit 
opinion is explained. The final portion o f the vignette contains a description o f a 
financial reversal six months after the unqualified opinion was issued by the auditors.
The participants include bankers, CPAs and potential jurors. These three 
groups represent financial statement users, financial statement preparers and the 
decision makers in a litigation situation between these two parties. The participants are 
asked to determine the degree o f financial culpability, if any, that would be attributed to 
the auditor, as a result o f the client’s financial reversal. This is expressed as a 
percentage o f the total financial shortfall. The responses reflect the participants’ 
perception o f the auditor’s financial responsibility under normal audit conditions.
Six sub-scenarios are introduced to the participants reflecting the six auditor 
behaviors being examined. In each sub-scenario the participants are asked to determine 
the degree o f financial culpability, if any, that would be attributed to the auditor, as a 
result o f the client’s financial reversal.
Research conducted by Barlett (1993) indicates that auditor independence is a 
continuous variable. Making the transition from auditor independence to assessing 
auditor financial responsibility places the issue in a different perspective. The defendant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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auditor either wins or loses the case based on the merits o f the arguments and the 
attitudes and perceptions o f the jurists. If the auditor is to be held financially 
responsible, what percentage of the total financial shortfall shall be borne by the 
auditor?
Statement o f the Problem 
There are three constituent groups involved in the financial reporting process: 
financial statement preparers (and their auditors), financial statement users (investors 
and lenders), and the judicial system, where conflicts between users and preparers are 
resolved. In a transparent reporting system, the financial statement should contain all 
of the information necessary for investors and lenders to make informed decisions. 
Auditors express a professional opinion on the financial statements, providing financial 
statement users with independent assurance that the statements conform to GAAP and 
contain all o f the required disclosures.
When financial statement users incur losses, they frequently turn to the financial 
statement preparers and/or their auditors for relief. If the financial statements are found 
to be misleading, a case can be made in support o f the financial statement user’s claim. 
On the surface this appears to be a relatively straight forward issue. Unfortunately, 
financial reporting is subject to professional judgement. Generally accepted accounting 
principles provide alternatives that can cause identical business transactions to be 
reported differently. The subjectivity of the preparation process can lead to conflicts 
between financial statement preparers and users.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The auditor is in the unique position of working for the financial statement 
preparer, while the audit opinion is for the benefit o f the financial statement user. The 
subjectivity o f the financial preparation process, combined with potential extended 
business relationships between auditor and client, can place the auditor in a 
compromised position. Third parties may perceive the auditor as representing the 
interests o f the client rather than those o f the financial statement users.
This research addresses six behavioral situations that are identified as 
“independence” issues in the research literature. The study involves the comparison o f 
responses to perceived increases in auditor financial liability as a result o f each one o f 
the six behavioral situations.
Prior research has demonstrated that those individuals who are least informed 
about auditing and accounting matters are most likely to perceive auditor independence 
as compromised when auditors participate in business relationships with clients beyond 
the traditional auditor-auditee relationship. This information provides the profession 
with guidance for the revision o f professional standards; yet it fails to capture the 
financial liability currently associated with practicing public accounting.
Typical jurors who participate in a trial between the defendant-auditor and the 
plaintiff-third party have no prior knowledge of auditing. If these persons perceive the 
auditor as a “public watchdog,” auditor-client management relationships that overreach 
the auditor-auditee relationship will place the defendant-auditor at a disadvantage.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether uninformed jurors would 
hold the auditor financially responsible for a business reversal subsequent to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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issuance o f the audited financial statements. The subjects assess the amount o f 
financial responsibility in a traditional auditor-auditee relationship. This provides a base 
line o f exposure where there is no appearance o f compromised independence. This 
situation is then compared with six auditor-auditee management situations that have 
been identified in prior research as having the potential o f compromised independence. 
This issue under study is not independence but rather the financial responsibility o f the 
auditor as perceived by potential jurors.
The integrity of the financial reporting process is dependent on the ability o f 
auditors to maintain an independent, objective perspective regarding the client’s 
financial statements. This means evaluating the appropriateness of alternatives in 
accounting principles selected by the client management. It is not the auditor’s 
responsibility to select and defend the position but rather to evaluate management’s 
decision, based on how well it represents the actual results of operations and financial 
position o f the company. Arguing an accounting position as an agent or representative 
o f the client before a regulatory authority would suggest a behavior that could be 
interpreted as not independent. The auditor would not be exercising professional 
skepticism on the client’s accounting information and reporting. The first research 
hypothesis states:
H I: Active advocacy for client accounting policies that diverge from GAAP 
result in the auditor incurring increased financial responsibility for the client's 
subsequent business reversal.
One o f the most widely contested issues is the provision o f nonaudit services to 
audit clients. The second research hypothesis addresses this issue. High levels of
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nonaudit services were expected to negatively affect the appearance o f independence.
It was expected that the participants would perceive this behavior as an impairment of
the ability o f the auditor to perform independently. The auditor under this
circumstance was expected to be held financially responsible for the client's business
failure. This research hypothesis states:
H2: The behavior associated with the provision of significant nonaudit services 
to an audit client results in the auditor incurring increased financial 
responsibility for the client's business failure.
A situation in which a client represents a significant portion o f the firm’s annual
billings was also thought to compromise the auditor's independence. Client or fee size
may not appear to be a significant issue to large national CPA firms; however, it may
have a significant impact on the career o f the partner and staff responsible for the audit.
In addressing the issue o f fee size, the research hypothesis was framed within the
context of the audit partner-in-charge. It was expected that increases in fee size related
to the audit partner’s total annual billing responsibility would negatively affect the
appearance o f independence, and result in the auditor being held financially responsible
for the client's business failure. The third research hypothesis states:
H3: When one client represents a significant portion o f the audit partner's total 
annual billing responsibility, the auditor will incur increased financial 
responsibility for the client's business failure.
In hiring or replacing accounting personnel, clients traditionally have looked to 
the employees of their CPA firms. Because o f prior contact, audit personnel receive 
offers o f employment. The cordial working relationship is enhanced when the former 
audit employee becomes client accounting management. This might be considered a
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compromise of independence, depending on the degree of influence client management
might have over the auditor. From a research perspective the prior employment o f the
client management personnel by the audit firm was expected to negatively affect the
appearance o f independence and result in the auditor being held financially responsible
for the client's business failure. The fourth research hypothesis states:
H4: The hiring o f audit personnel subsequent to the audit engagement by client 
management results in the audit firm incurring increased financial responsibility 
for the client's business failure.
Other national firms may follow the lead o f Arthur Andersen in establishing a 
separate consulting firm that meets the requirements established by the SEC. To 
determine whether this arrangement resulted in perceived independence, the fifth 
research question dealt with joint venture relations between client and CPA firm. Close 
joint venture relations were expected to negatively affect the appearance o f 
independence and result in the auditor being held financially responsible for the client's 
business failure.
This research hypothesis states:
HS: Co-contracting arrangements between client and CPA firm result in the 
auditor incurring increased financial responsibility for the client's business 
failure.
The so-called expectation gap standards, SASs No. S3 through No. 61, direct 
auditors to pursue more actively the detection and reporting o f errors and irregularities 
in conducting the audit. These SASs identify a series o f procedures that need to be 
conducted as part of the annual audit. The intent o f the standards is to heighten the 
auditor’s professional skepticism. It is possible to conduct the mechanical procedures
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and still experience an audit failure. This is especially true in the situation of
management fraud. The public and regulators are not sympathetic to the auditing
profession even though auditors have made it clear that under certain circumstances the
detection o f management fraud may be impossible. The reaction o f the public when
management fraud is discovered is to blame the auditors for failing to detect the fraud.
There is no way to determine the mental attitude o f the auditor during the audit
engagement. Hindsight, the final outcome o f the case, appears to be the only means o f
obtaining information about the auditor’s performance during the engagement. The
final research hypothesis states:
H6: The discovery and disclosure o f management fraud subsequent to the 
issuance o f an unqualified opinion will result in the auditor incurring increased 
financial responsibility for the client's business failure.
Theoretical Base
Attribution theory has been applied to the performance-expectation gap issue 
(Arrington, Hillison, & Williams, 1983; Arrington, Bailey, & Hopwood, 198S). This 
theory posits that there are three kinds of information - (1) consensus, (2) consistency, 
and (3) distinctiveness - used in deriving causal attributions. Applying this to the audit 
expectation-performance gap issue results in a conclusion that financial statement users 
attribute most business failures to the performance o f the CPA, whereas CPAs attribute 
such failures to situational characteristics. This area o f research supports the notion 
that there is a continuing expectations-performance gap between CPAs and users o f the 
financial statements.
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Definition o f Some Terms 
The audit expectations-performance gap as defined by Porter (1993) is the 
difference "between society's expectations o f auditors and auditors' performance, as 
perceived by society." This definition differentiates between true audit failures 
(performance gap) and those circumstances that are perceived to be failures by society 
(reasonableness gap). A gap in performance may be caused by either deficient 
standards or deficient performance. This study focuses on deficiencies in performance, 
which are described as the "gap between the expected standard o f performance of 
auditors' existing duties and auditors' perceived performance, as expected and 
perceived by society."
The second general standard of GAAS requires that an auditor maintain an 
independent mental attitude in all matters relating to the engagement (AICPA, 199S, 
v.2). This standard addresses the mental attitude o f the auditor that describes 
independence "in fact." In reality it is impossible to determine the mental attitude o f the 
auditor. Therefore, the Code o f Professional Conduct, Rule 101-Independence, 
approaches independence from the perspective of appearance. How would 
knowledgeable and informed individuals evaluate the relationship between the auditor 
and the client management? It is this definition of independence that is the focus o f the 
present study.
Delimitations o f the Problem 
This study focuses on auditor behaviors that are strictly performance 
deficiencies. It is assumed that the professional standards as promulgated are
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satisfactory in guiding the performance o f auditors. Auditors' performance within these 
standards would be perceived to be adequate by the public.
As discussed above, the concept o f independence refers to the perceptions of 
informed and knowledgeable individuals. This study does not attempt to address the 
mental attitude of the auditor. Further, the evaluation is made by persons who are 
eligible to serve on a jury. These individuals were not necessarily well informed with 
respect to accounting and auditing matters.
Limitations o f the Study 
The normal limitations o f survey studies apply. Juror responses as to 
anticipated behavior may not reflect true behavior under more realistic conditions. The 
participants did not receive instructions from the judge or listen to arguments and 
testimony from the plaintiff and defense. The responses to the survey reflect jurist 
predisposition to certain decisions prior to the true trial experience.
A sample of jurors was obtained from a jury pool that was impaneled by the 
judge at a specific time. This was not a random sample but represented the potential 
jurors for a specific court calendar. Typically, the pool is called based on the first letter 
o f the last name of the registered voters in the voting district.
For the sake o f consistency, the samples o f bankers and CPAs were drawn from 
the same geographic region. The bankers selected were loan officers. This group 
represents frequent users o f audited financial statements. The CPAs were also drawn 
from approximately the same geographic region o f the country.
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The generalizability o f the results is restricted because the samples were drawn 
from such a limited geographical region. The participants are residents o f Eastern New 
Mexico which is a rural region that is agriculturally-based. The moral, philosophical, 
and political characteristics may not represent the predisposition o f jurors located in an 
urban region with an industrial and service economy.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Perception o f Independence 
Much of the early research in perceptions o f auditor independence focused on 
the comparison of CPA perceptions with that o f other sophisticated financial statement 
users. Lavin (1976) examined the perceptions o f AICPA members, bank loan officers, 
and research financial analysts. In Lavin’s study, twelve client-auditor situations were 
selected from Accounting Series Release No. 126 (ASR)(SEC, 1972). These were 
client-auditor situations that the SEC interpreted as compromising auditor 
independence. Two of those selected, electronic data processing and bookkeeping 
services, were considered by the AICPA (1995, v.2) as not having a compromising 
effect on auditor independence. This provides a contrast in expectations between the 
established professional and primary governmental regulatory bodies.
Two research questions were examined in the Lavin study. First, the consensus 
o f opinion within and between three groups o f subjects was studied. The second 
research question involved an analysis o f the degree o f alignment with the regulatory 
authorities from which the client-auditor situations were derived. Did the consensus
21
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opinions o f any of the subject groups agree with the positions taken by one of the 
regulatory authorities?
The results indicated that for most o f the client-auditor situations the within- 
group consensus was relatively high. Between-group differences existed in two client- 
auditor situations. In the situation where the accounting firm provides bookkeeping 
services to an audit client, the AICPA members perceived this to  be an impairment o f 
independence. In contrast, the other two groups of subjects demonstrated a lack o f 
consensus on the issue. The second client-auditor situation that failed to achieve 
between-group consensus was the acceptance o f five-year promissory notes in payment 
of the audit fee. There was a lack o f consensus among the AICPA members, whereas 
the bankers and research analysts perceived this situation to be an impairment o f 
auditor independence.
When comparing the respondents’ perceptions with the regulations of the 
AICPA and SEC there was no consensus with either of the regulatory bodies. The 
largest divergence in perception was between the respondents and the positions taken 
by the SEC. The results suggest that client-auditor situations that the SEC judges to 
impair independence are perceived by the respondents as relatively benign. If  the SEC, 
and to a lesser degree the AICPA, are basing their regulations on the perceptions o f 
financial statement users, a reexamination o f such perceptions appears to be 
appropriate.
Expanding on the number o f auditor-client relationships to be examined, Firth 
(1980) developed a questionnaire that incorporated examples taken from the Institute
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o f Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) and the Institute o f 
Chartered Accountants o f Scotland (ICAS). The instrument contained 29 questions 
that were grouped into the four categories identified by the British Institutes: fees, 
personal relationships, financial involvement with clients, and conflicts o f interest. The 
sample consisted o f five groups of subjects including chartered accountants working for 
the (then) big eight, chartered accountants in other public practices, chartered 
accountants working in industry and commerce, financial analysts, and bank loan 
officers.
The participants were asked to evaluate the impact of the auditor-client 
relationships in terms o f both independence and the importance o f such independence 
on investment and lending decisions. Firth found significant differences between the 
groups. Financial analysts and loan officers perceived the auditors to lack 
independence in the largest number of auditor-client situations. Chartered accountants 
working in industry and commerce were rated second in the number o f cases identified 
as lacking independence. In contrast, chartered accountants in public practice 
perceived a much smaller number o f the auditor-client situations as lacking 
independence. The results also indicated that the user groups (financial analysts and 
loan officers) consistently perceived non-independence as a potential impairment in 
investment and lending decisions. Practicing public accountants, the group most 
affected by this issue, attributed less importance to compromises in independence to 
investment and loan decisions.
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The independence of public accounting firms may be impaired if an auditor 
subsequently accepts a position with client management. This is a common practice in 
public accounting. The "up-or-out" personnel policies o f most firms creates an 
attractive supply of very qualified accountants for business and industry. Cross-hiring 
may compromise the ability o f auditors to remain objective and independent on 
subsequent audit engagements.
In 1978, Imhoff examined this aspect o f the auditor-client management 
relationship. The first phase o f the research focused on the rate at which auditors were 
hired by client management. The overall turnover rate in ImhofPs sample o f audit staff 
was approximately 23%. Of this group approximately 20% were hired by client 
management. Almost 80% o f these former auditors worked on the audit engagement 
prior to switching jobs.
The second phase involved a survey to determine the perceptions o f financial 
statement users (bankers and financial analysts) and CPAs (members o f the AICPA) 
regarding auditing firm independence when audit staff are hired by client management. 
Two variables were introduced in the scenario to differentiate between the perceptions 
o f the two experimental groups. The variables were the audit firm capacity o f the CPA 
and the time lag between the audit engagement and subsequent employment o f the 
auditor.
The results indicate that job transfers to client firms exacerbate the audit 
expectation-performance gap. Both the auditor-rank variable and the time-lag variable 
affected the perceptions o f independence of both financial statement users and CPAs.
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The greater the level o f responsibility on the engagement and the shorter the time-lag, 
the more likely was auditor independence perceived to be impaired. At all levels, 
financial statement users perceived more problems with independence than did CPAs.
Corporate shareholders were used as subjects in a study o f perceived auditor 
independence conducted by Pany and Reckers (1980). The effect o f gifts and 
discounts, and the size of the audit engagement fee relative to total office revenues on 
perceived auditor independence were examined.
The subjects had purchased at least one 100 share block o f common stock in 
companies listed on the American or New York Stock Exchanges. The results 
indicated that gifts and/or purchase discounts at even the most modest levels had a 
negative impact on the perception of auditor independence. The variable reflecting 
relative client size was manipulated at the 1% and 10% levels o f total office revenues. 
Neither o f  these had any statistical significance in inferring an influence on perceived 
auditor independence. Shareholders did not perceive that the independence o f the 
auditor was compromised because the audit engagement represented a significant 
portion (10%) o f the office billings.
In contrast to prior research findings, McKinley, Pany, and Reckers (1985) 
discovered that the provision o f management advisory services (MAS) to audit clients 
had no effect on loan decisions or perceptions of independence. The survey 
respondents were experienced loan officers, which may have influenced the results.
This group o f subjects would be familiar with the audit process and the use o f audited 
financial statements in the financial industry.
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The provision o f MAS variable was set at either zero or 30% of the average 
audit fee over the previous three years. This level o f MAS service appears to be 
realistic under current market conditions. The respondents indicated that the financial 
statements were more reliable, i.e. free o f the existence o f fraud, when the auditing firm 
also provided MAS services.
Attribution Theory
Arrington, Hillison and Williams (1983) used attribution theory to explain the 
differences in perception of auditor responsibility between small business owners and 
auditors. Attribution theory posits that there are three types o f information useful in 
evaluating the performance of auditors: procedural consensus, consistency o f reputable 
performance over time, and audit task distinctiveness.
In assessing the cause of an outcome, auditors place the greatest emphasis on 
procedural consensus. The adherence to generally accepted auditing standards is 
considered by the auditing profession to be an adequate demonstration o f the 
fulfillment o f professional responsibility. In contrast, third parties, represented by small 
business owners in the study, found such information to be of little use in forming such 
judgements.
The small business owners attributed greater weight to the other two sources o f 
information. The consistency o f reputable performance over time provides an 
indication o f the performance record of the individual auditor. If the auditor has had a
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series o f audit failures, a current audit failure would more likely be attributed to the
performance o f the auditor rather than environmental circumstances.
High audit task distinctiveness implies that audit failure would be common
under a set o f unique business conditions but not under normal circumstances. An
example may include the risks associated with an enterprise operating in the
biotechnology industry where failure is relatively common. This information may cause
the third party observer to attribute an audit failure to environmental circumstances.
A survey instrument was prepared that included seven audit failure situations.
The participants consisted of small business owners and CPAs. The subjects were to
assign a total o f 100 points on the basis o f importance to those attributes that appeared
to have caused the audit failure. The three types o f information were operationalized in
an auditing context as follows:
Consensus: the extent to which the auditor's actions conformed to generally 
accepted auditing standards.
Consistency: the auditor's history o f prior audit failures and/or litigation with 
clients.
Distinctiveness: the degree that the audit situation is unusual, diminishing the 
advantage o f prior experience.
The results indicated that the small business owners were more likely to 
attribute audit failures to the behavior o f auditors and to other environmental factors.
In contrast, auditors focused primary attention to the consensus factors causing them to 
attribute the audit failures to client and/or environmental factors. Small business 
owners consistently attributed more responsibility to auditors’ performance than the
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auditors were willing to accept, thus confirming the existence o f an audit expectation- 
performance gap.
In a follow-up study, Arrington, Bailey, and Hopwood (1985) observed that 
CPA subjects gave consideration to all three of the information factors: consensus, 
consistency, and distinctiveness; whereas the business owners focused on the most 
obvious information cue to the exclusion o f other relevant information. Business 
owners attributed the business M ure to auditor performance, based on this single 
information cue. As in the first study, consensus information was the most important 
information component, but CPAs combined this information with at least one o f the 
other two sources of information.
Nonaudit Versus Audit Fees 
There has been some concern that the importance o f non-audit engagements to 
the audit firm might affect the quality of the annual audit engagement. Using objective 
information that is publicly disclosed in Australia, Wines (1994) conducted a study to 
determine the relationship between audit opinion qualification and the relative 
importance of non-audit service fees to the accounting firm. Unlike survey data, this 
provides an objective approach to the study of the appearance o f independence. In 
comparing the ratio o f non-audit to audit fees on the issuance o f a qualified opinion, 
Wines acknowledges that this may be a relatively weak measure o f overall audit quality. 
The results indicate that the appearance of independence may be impaired when high
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levels o f non-audit services are provided to audit clients. The greater the ratio o f non­
audit to audit fees the less chance o f a qualified or adverse audit opinion.
Degrees o f Independence 
Most o f the research regarding the appearance of auditor independence treats 
independence as a dichotomous variable. Auditors are judged either to be independent 
or to lack independence. Carmichael and Swieringa (1968) argue that independence is 
a matter o f degree and not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Based on this argument, 
Bartlett (1993) designed a study to examine the nature of the independence construct. 
Using an expanded Likert scale with values ranging from 0 (not independent at all) to 
100 (completely independent), Bartlett solicited responses that reflected the range o f 
possible situations. Treating independence as a continuous variable provides additional 
information regarding the variation between respondents.
In addition to testing for the range of independence, Bartlett also examined the 
impact of audit fee size relative to total annual billings and the degree o f accounting 
and auditing knowledge of the participants. His sample consisted of bankers and 
CPAs, presumably knowledgeable and sophisticated financial statement users.
The survey instrument contained ten audit case situations that reflected various 
auditor-client relationships. The perceptions of CPAs and bankers were compared. 
Both groups of subjects had no problem differentiating between the case situations and 
assigning relative values to the independence construct. There was clearly a continuum 
of perceived independence. In eight of the ten situations, CPAs perceived less threat to
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auditor independence than did the bankers. Determining the exact point at which the 
auditor loses the appearance o f independence remains undetermined but is o f 
considerable interest to researchers and professionals.
In situations where MAS services were provided to audit clients, bankers 
perceived significant reductions in auditor independence; CPAs perceived no 
compromise in independence. The relative size o f the client was studied at two levels. 
At the first level the client represented 1% o f total firm billings. The second level 
measured engagement billings from the perspective o f the partner-in-charge. The audit 
engagement represented 40% o f the total annual billings o f the partner-in-charge. As 
compared with the CPA respondents, bankers perceived a significant decrease on the 
independence continuum on this second level.
Perceptions within the Justice System 
As a departure from the typical audit expectation-performance gap research, 
Lowe (1994) examined and compared judicial and auditor attitudes toward the auditing 
profession. This is one of the first studies involving judges, who are an integral part o f 
the decision-making process in resolving auditor liability cases. This is o f particular 
significance because o f the degree of influence these participants have in litigation 
against accountants (Jennings, Reckers, and Kneer, 1991).
The judges selected as subjects in this study were participating in a continuing 
educational program at the National Judicial College. They were general jurisdiction
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state and federal judges. A single office o f one o f the big six public accounting firms 
was used to obtain CPA subjects.
As might be expected, the variance in judges’ responses was much higher than 
that o f the CPAs. Even with the adoption o f the “new” audit report as a result o f SAS 
No. 58, judges appeared to be uncertain as to the financial statement responsibilities of 
auditors. The judges held auditors to a much higher standard for the detection of fraud 
than the profession acknowledges as the auditors’ responsibility in SAS No. 53.
Judges perceived the auditor as a “public watchdog,” actively pursuing the search for 
fraud, irrespective of materiality.
The results indicate that judges have significantly higher expectations o f 
auditors than the profession claims to be able to deliver. The significant difference in 
perceptions o f auditor independence and responsibility for financial statements places 
auditors at a distinct disadvantage in a litigation setting.
One disturbing response from CPAs was to the auditor-client relationship 
described as “working together hand-in-glove,” resulting in auditors not being 
independent. The CPA responses indicated a surprising degree of uncertainty 
regarding the true relationship between audit client and auditor. In light o f the 
specificity in the auditing standards as to the responsibility o f auditors to be 
independent in fact and appearance, this result was unexpected.
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Hindsight Bias
All research up to this point has focused on the predisposition o f the subjects to 
interpret the auditor-client relationship. Subjects were given a fact pattern and asked to 
determine whether the auditor was independent iwth respect to the client. In a 
dissertation examining “hindsight bias,” Lowe (1993) carried the inquiry one step 
further. Hindsight bias is the current knowledge of an event that frames the perception 
o f the juror in evaluating prior performance o f the auditor. Higher relevance is given to 
negative factors in the case when the outdome is negative. The reverse is also true, 
positive factors take on more salience when the outcome is positive.
The subjects were given information on the final outcome. Important to auditor 
liability, Lowe observed that knowledge o f the negative outcome biased jurors, causing 
them to blame the auditors for failing to foresee and anticipate the subsequent financial 
problems o f the audit client.
The subjects included prospective jurors and auditors from one o f the big six 
public accounting firms. This appears to be the first attempt to evaluate the attitudes of 
potential jurors and compare the results with the attitudes of auditors.
A business failure and the precipitating events were described. The subjects 
were told that the independent auditors issued an unqualified audit opinion on the 
financial statements o f the company just months before the ultimate financial collapse 
of the company. Based on this information the juror subjects attributed the lack of 
disclosure o f the impending financial failure to auditor negligence. The auditor subjects
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were much less inclined to attribute the lack o f disclosure on auditor failure. This 
outcome has serious implications for auditors in a dynamic business environment.
As a follow-up, Anderson, Lowe, and Reckers (1993) studied hindsight bias 
with state and federal judges as subjects. Consistent with the psychological theory 
regarding actor-observer bias, there was a significant difference in the evaluations of 
judges regarding auditor performance as compared with that o f the auditors. The 
judges provided significantly lower evaluations of auditors' performance. The findings 
indicate outcome information had a significant effect on the perceptions developed 
from the case information.
The researchers suggested that the audit expectation-performance gap consists 
o f two perceptual differences between CPAs and third party observers. The first o f 
these is a function o f group perception. Auditors are more familiar with the audit 
process and are the actors in that process. They tend to attribute less influence to 
auditors for both positive and negative outcomes. In contrast, non-auditors are 
observers who may not be as familiar with the audit process and perceive auditors as 
having significant influence (possibly unrealistic) over the outcome.
The second perceptual difference may be described as the time perspective o f 
the situation. Third parties, including the judges in this study, evaluate auditor 
decisions ex-post, after decisions are made and the final results are known. By the 
nature o f the profession, auditors must make decisions regarding the client’s financial 
situation on an ex-ante basis, before all o f the facts are known. Group differences and
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tuning differences interact to confound attempts to mitigate the audit expectation- 
perception gap.
Co-contracting Relationships 
The design and implementation o f accounting information systems have 
traditionally been important components o f consulting services provided by public 
accounting firms. The rapid development o f computer technology has presented 
challenges and opportunities. To maintain this important market niche, public 
accounting firms have become involved in relationships with hardware and software 
organizations that can provide the computer technology while the accountants provide 
the accounting systems expertise. Lowe and Pany (1994) discuss the development of 
these relationships as they relate to auditor independence. The issue revolves around 
the auditing o f an organization with which the CPA firm has entered into a co­
contracting arrangement to provide services to third parties.
The AICPA allows CPA firms to  participate in co-contracting arrangements 
with audit clients as long as the revenues derived are not material. Regardless o f the 
materiality o f the relationship, the SEC does not allow co-contracting relationships 
between auditors and clients. The co-contracting relationships prohibited by the SEC 
include: joint ventures, limited partnership agreements, investments in supplier or 
customer companies, leasing interests, and sales by the accountant o f items other than 
professional services.
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The prohibition o f co-contracting agreements by the SEC would appear to 
remove this auditor-client relationship from the study o f auditor independence. The 
growth and strategic importance o f this type o f consulting service has encouraged the 
development o f creative strategies by public accounting firms. One o f the big six CPA 
firms, Arthur Andersen, appears to have discovered an acceptable solution. The firm 
underwent a major plan of restructuring that allowed its consulting division to operate 
as a separate partnership, Andersen Consulting, from the accounting and auditing firm 
o f Arthur Andersen. The SEC has ruled that Andersen Consulting may enter into co­
contracting agreements with audit clients o f Arthur Andersen. This organizational 
restructuring was both costly and time consuming for Arthur Andersen and it is unclear 
whether the other big six firms will adopt similar organizational structures. However, 
the necessity o f public accounting firms to compete for consulting business may force 
them to consider this option.
Lowe and Pany (1994) discuss the importance o f co-contracting for public 
accounting firms that wish to remain competitive in the rapidly evolving environment of 
information technology. It is argued that such arrangements are necessary if they are to 
maintain their strategic position in this market. The authors suggest possible standards 
that would provide safeguards and still allow public accounting firms to participate in 
such co-contracting agreements.
At present, the unique configuration o f Arthur Andersen provides a significant 
competitive advantage. Andersen Consulting, as a separate legal entity, is allowed to 
work with the audit clients including co-contracting, whereas the remaining big six and
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most other public accounting firms are not. By insisting on organizational form over 
the substance o f the client-auditor relationship, the SEC has artificially manipulated 
market conditions.
Lowe and Pany suggest that U. S.-based accounting firms are being placed at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis non-public accounting consulting firms and 
international competitors. The SEC argues that co-contracting impairs the appearance 
o f independence and it is therefore not in the public interest to allow co-contracting.
There are currently no studies on the influence o f this type o f auditor-client 
relationship on auditor independence. The expected growth in this part o f the 
consulting industry would indicate that it may become a significant issue in the future.
In evaluating auditor-client relationships, restructured public accounting firms with co­
contracting agreements such as Andersen Consulting, may represent a significant 
portion o f public accounting practice.
Summary
The literature indicates that the study o f auditor independence has primarily 
focused on the contrast in perceptions of financial statement users with that o f CPAs.
It has only been recently that attention has been directed to judges and potential jurors 
as subjects, even though these are the ultimate decision makers when it comes to 
accountants’ legal liability. Prior research has clearly demonstrated that non­
accountants perceive auditors as having responsibility for protecting the public. The 
results are mixed as to whether knowledge of accounting and/or auditing reduces this
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expectation. Judges and potential jurors have a predisposition to expect that auditors 
will function as detectives to examine and investigate all errors, illegal acts and 
fraudulent behavior perpetrated by employees and management. This does not imply 
that the process o f hearing the case would not in some way alter such perception. At 
present the only access that researchers have had has been to pretrial subjects. The 
process o f plaintiff and defense arguments may help to inform the judge and jury as to 
what might be considered reasonable and attainable expectations o f auditor 
performance. Until researchers are able to access post trial participants, our knowledge 
will be limited to the predisposition o f the subjects.
Prior research has used auditor independence as a construct to represent the 
subjects’ perceptions as to auditors’ legal liability. On the surface this appears to be a 
safe assumption, although in McKinley, Pany and Reckers (198S) non-auditor subjects 
indicated that consulting services that provide the design and implementation of 
accounting information systems enhanced the perception that the audit client would be 
less likely to have errors or irregularities in the financial statements.
In the current study, the assertion of financial culpability is assessed directly. In 
each situation the research question states: Is the auditor being held financially 
responsible for the client’s subsequent business reversal?
Six auditor behavioral situations that may imply an impairment o f independence 
are examined. Such impairment is assumed to cause the subjects to perceive that the 
auditor was negligent in performing the audit processes and failed to disclose 
information that would lead to the ultimate financial reversal o f the business. The six
i
i
i
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behavioral situations are: auditor advocacy o f client accounting positions, the provision 
o f management advisory services to audit clients, the size o f the audit fee relative to the 
total billings responsibility o f the partner-in-charge, clients’ cross-hiring o f auditors, co­
contracting between auditor and audit client, and auditor failure to detect and report on 
management fraud.
Prior research has examined some o f the auditor behaviors o f interest in this 
study within the context o f auditor independence. They are: the provision o f 
management advisory services to audit clients, the relative size o f the audit fee 
compared to total annual billings responsibility o f the partner-in-charge, and clients 
hiring o f auditors subsequent to the audit engagement. Active advocacy o f client 
accounting policies, co-contracting agreements between accounting firm and audit 
client and the failure to detea and disclose management fraud have not been included 
in these studies. Utilizing these six auditor behaviors as examples o f potential impaired 
independence, this study examines the subjeas’ perceptions of auditor financial 
responsibly to third parties when the client experiences a financial reversal.
As Chief Accountant Schuetze suggested, the advocacy o f incredible client 
accounting policies needs to be examined within the context of the auditors’ legal 
liability. The appearance o f independence is clearly violated if auditors are advocates in 
recommending and supporting accounting policies that diverge from GAAP. It would 
seem that financial responsibility follows.
With the adoption o f the so-called expeaation gap SASs, the responsibility of 
auditors for the detection and disclosure o f management fraud has evolved over the
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years. Auditors have long unsuccessfully attempted to avoid responsibility for fraud 
auditing. The changing legal climate and congressional and regulatory pressure have 
placed auditors in the position of assuming responsibility for designing the audit so as 
to detect within reason, errors and irregularities including management fraud. The final 
behavioral situation is the subsequent discovery o f management fraud. Because it is 
not possible for third parties to observe the failure o f auditors to discover and to 
disclose management fraud, subsequent discovery will serve as a surrogate for auditor 
failure.
This study measures the degree o f perceived financial responsibility attributed 
to auditors under a variety o f circumstances. Utilizing behavioral characteristics 
identified in the independence literature, comparisons are made between the traditional 
auditor-auditee relationship and those that might be compromised. The data provides a 
better understanding o f the perceived responsibilities attributed to independent 
auditors.
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CHAPTER 3
PROCEDURES
To examine the six research hypothesis, a survey instrument was developed and 
administered. The results are analyzed through the use o f a single-factor repeated 
measures design model. The purpose o f this analysis was to determine whether there 
were statistically significant differences in auditors’ financial liability between the 
normal audit situation and each of the six behavioral scenarios. Additional analyses are 
conducted using multiple regression models to explain, for each behavioral scenario, 
the differences in financial liability perceptions as a result o f subject group membership, 
demographic or socioeconomic variables. Procedures for evaluating the aptness o f the 
above two types of models are discussed in this chapter and the following chapter.
Sample Selection
This study examines and compares responses from three distinct groups of 
individuals. The first group consists o f citizens o f the United States who have been 
called for jury duty. These are the ultimate decision makers in the litigation struggle 
between auditors and users o f audited financial statements who have suffered a 
financial loss that might be attributed to the lack of information in the audited financial 
statements.
40
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The optimum approach in collecting opinion from jurors would have been to 
conduct post trial interviews with jurors where the defendant was an auditor. The 
jurors would have been briefed by the judge regarding their responsibility in deciding a 
case in this setting. Plaintiff and defendant counsels would have presented arguments 
that clarified the professional responsibilities o f  auditors. Confidentiality within the 
court system as well as limited financial resources make such an approach impractical.
An alternative approach to data collection was used which consisted o f 
surveying individuals who have been called for jury duty. Not all o f these individuals 
actually served on a jury, however they were selected by the state for consideration.
The selection process varies from state to state. In the State of New Mexico, jurors are 
selected based on driver’s license registration and voter registration. Each term, the 
clerk o f the court requests a list o f names that will be used in the jury selection process 
for that term. Names are selected in alphabetical rotation.
It is unlikely that the prospective jurors had any knowledge o f accounting or 
auditing. Participation in a trial could enhance their knowledge o f accounting and their 
understanding o f the role of the independent auditor. This additional knowledge may 
have altered their original perception. It is important to recognize that the prospective 
jurors in this study did not have the benefit o f learning through the trial experience.
In this study, the sample was drawn from the jury pools of Curry and Roosevelt 
Counties, as selected by the State o f New Mexico. The impaneled jury was given the 
survey instruments and asked to complete them during the lengthy waiting period 
during jury selection. The residents o f this rural agricultural area traditionally have
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been conservative. It was anticipated that the prospective jurors reflect this 
conservative orientation both politically and economically.
The preparers and users o f  financial statements have been the primary groups of 
individuals involved in the standards-setting process. Prior research has indicated that 
increased knowledge about accounting and auditing has an effect on one’s perception 
o f the role o f the auditor (Lowe, 1994.) Audit failure is not as likely to be attributed to 
auditor malpractice by those who are informed about the auditing process. Two 
additional groups of subjects were selected to represent preparers and users o f financial 
statements. The subjects from these two groups were drawn from the same basic 
population as that of the juror group.
As representatives o f financial statement users, bankers were selected from the 
membership roster of the New Mexico Banking Association. In order to obtain a 
sufficient sample, participation in the study was not restricted to residents o f eastern 
New Mexico. The survey participants were limited to loan officers, the bankers who 
most frequently use financial statements that are prepared by business entities and 
audited by CPAs.
Based on the membership o f the New Mexico Society o f Certified Public 
Accountants, a regional data base has been prepared by the Eastern New Mexico 
University Student Accounting Society. This mailing list was used to survey CPAs. It 
represents a population of professional accountants who practice public accounting in 
the same geographic region as the juror population. As a surrogate for preparers of
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financial statements, they have a vested interest in maintaining the integrity o f the 
financial reporting system.
The data derived from these three sources is analyzed and compared.
Variables
The assessment o f financial liability o f the auditor is regarded as a continuous 
dependent variable. The participant responses are ranked on a scale from 0 to 100.
The auditor was judged by the participant to have no financial responsibility with a 
score o f 0 or to have some financial responsibility with a score o f more than 0, up to 
100. This configuration results in the dependent variable, auditor financial liability, 
having a range o f 0 percent to 100 percent.
Six auditor behaviors are believed to impair independence. Five of these 
behaviors may be observed directly: auditor advocacy o f client accounting policies, the 
provision o f management advisory services to audit clients, the relative importance o f 
the audit fee to the total annual billing responsibility o f the partner-in-charge, the cross­
hiring o f auditors by audit clients, and co-contracting agreements between auditor and 
audit client. The final auditor behavior examines the failure o f the auditor to detect and 
report on management fraud. There is no practical way for non-auditors to observe 
this behavior directly. Subsequent discovery o f management fraud serves as a proxy 
for this behavior.
In addition to these six behavioral situations, the normal audit is included to 
provide a point o f reference. It is assumed that the independent auditor assumes some
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minimal level o f risk for professional liability related to auditing financial statements. 
Assessing the degree o f risk above this base level provided information about the 
effects o f the behaviors. The respondents are assessing the degree of financial liability 
as a result o f these seven treatments.
Prior independence research (for example, Imhoff, 1978, Firth, 1980, and Pany 
and Reckers, 1980) has assumed that independence is an important factor in 
determining auditor professional responsibility. Auditor independence may be one of 
many factors that lead to a judgement where the auditor is held financially liable. 
Linking these behaviors o f impaired independence with auditor financial responsibility 
is an important component o f the present study.
Survey Instrument
A survey instrument is used to obtain responses from the three participant 
groups. A copy of this instrument is included in Appendix A. The instrument contains 
a brief vignette describing the client, industry, and management’s responsibility for the 
financial accounting system and reporting to third parties. The purpose and limitations 
o f an independent audit and the importance of an unqualified audit opinion are 
explained. The auditor will have conducted the audit in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). A brief explanation o f the significance o f GAAS, 
which are standards established by the profession and recognized by regulatory 
agencies and sophisticated financial statement users, is provided. The final portion o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
the vignette describes the subsequent financial reversal o f the company and ultimate 
business failure.
The instrument includes the basic text o f the vignette, and seven questions. The 
participants are asked to indicate their perceptions o f the auditor's financial 
responsibility in each audit situation. The first question reflected a normal audit 
situation where the auditor's activities were limited to performing the annual audit. The 
remaining six questions dealt with the six behaviors that were thought to compromise 
auditor independence. The question topics were as follows:
NA-Normal audit situation 
B1 - Auditor Advocacy 
B 2-Management Advisory Services 
B3-Audit Fees
B4-Cross-Hiring of Auditing Personnel 
B5-Co-Contracting Between Auditor and Client 
B6-Management Fraud
After reading the question the participant is asked to refer back to the original 
vignette, disregarding any o f the audit situations discussed in the other questions. Each 
question provided additional information about a particular auditor behavior under 
study that was to be added to the vignette to create a new situation. The participant 
was responding to this modified situation.
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In responding to each question, the participant places an X on a 100 point 
expanded Likert scale. This indicated the percentage o f financial responsibility that the 
participant attributed to the auditor in each situation.
As will be discussed in the next section, the single-factor repeated measures 
model was selected to analyze the data. One o f the weaknesses o f this model is that the 
responses may be influenced by the order (order effects) in which the treatments are 
presented to the participants. Additionally, there may be a carry-over effect that 
influences the participants’ responses to subsequent questions. To minimize the 
interference o f these influences, counterbalancing is utilized (Girden 1992, p. 3). Six 
versions o f the survey form were prepared. The Normal Audit question (NA) remains 
in the first position on each survey form. The other six behavioral questions (B1 
through B6) are counterbalanced as follows:
Form Q l NA B1 B2 B6 B3 BS B4
FormQ2 NA B2 B3 B1 B4 B6 BS
FormQ3 NA B3 B4 B2 B5 B1 B6
Form Q4 NA B4 B5 B3 B6 B2 B l
Form Q5 NA BS B6 B4 B1 B3 B2
FormQ6 NA B6 B1 B5 B2 B4 B3
The survey forms were assigned to the participants on a random basis. This 
insured that there would be a sufficient number o f responses to each form to minimize 
any possible order effects and/or carry-over effects.
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The survey instrument was administered directly to the juror group. These 
participants were members o f an impaneled jury. They were confined to a waiting area 
while the judge and attorneys were involved in the final jury selection process. They 
were willing participants, resulting in a relatively high response rate.
In contrast, the survey instrument was mailed to  the bankers and CPAs. The 
samples for these two groups were drawn from the same geographic region as that o f 
the jurors so that the samples represented the same population. This made it feasible to 
compare the three sample groups. In a mail survey it is much more difficult to get the 
subject to respond to  the instrument. There were two incentives for these participants. 
First, the cover letter (see Appendix A) indicates that a $1 bill was enclosed as a 
symbolic gesture o f compensation for the participant’s time. In addition, because these 
participants have a vested interest in the financial reporting system, a self-addressed 
stamped postcard was enclosed, giving the participant an opportunity to receive a copy 
o f the survey results after completion o f the research. These measures were anticipated 
to improve the response rate.
The last page o f the survey instrument contained questions for collecting data 
about the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics o f the three respondent 
groups. An attempt is made, using multiple regression analysis, to explain the 
differences in perception o f auditor financial liability among subjects for each o f the 
seven scenarios under scrutiny. Demographic and socioeconomic variables are a subset 
o f the explanatory variables used in the multiple regression analysis.
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The survey instrument was pilot tested using accounting students and faculty in 
the College o f Business at Eastern New Mexico University. The ambiguities found 
were corrected before the final instrument was prepared for use in the study.
Analysis o f Data
hi research that utilizes mailed survey instruments there is always a concern 
that the respondents as a  group differ from those who fail to respond. Responses to 
the survey instrument were anonymous, providing no means of following up on those 
members o f the sample who failed to reply. Short o f evaluating the characteristics of 
the nonrespondents, it was possible to test for differences between early and later 
respondents. If  there were statistically significant differences in responses between 
these two groups of respondents, there might be some concern that the perceptions of 
auditor responsibility was not adequately reflected in the study. The analysis is 
accomplished by dividing the survey responses into two subgroups. The median date 
o f receipt was used as the dividing line between early and late responses. For each 
audit situation the mean responses are compared by subgroup using a t-test. This 
provides information as to any differences that might exist between early and late 
respondents. In the current study, late respondents were used as a surrogate for 
nonrespondents.
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Single-Factor Repeated 
Measures Design Model
The analysis begins by use o f a single-factor repeated measures design model.
The purpose o f this analysis was to determine whether there are statistically significant
differences between the mean responses o f each o f the six behavioral audit situations
and the normal audit. The subjects were asked to  respond to seven treatments (the
normal audit plus six auditor behaviors.) A vignette describing the client company, the
audit circumstances, and an epilogue detailing the ultimate failure of the client company
was presented. The first treatment (the normal audit) asked the respondent to indicate
the percentage, if any, o f the financial shortfall that should be attributed to the auditor.
The remaining six treatments were representations o f the auditor behaviors discussed
above. In each treatment the participant was asked to attribute the percentage, if any,
o f auditor financial liability for the failure o f the business entity.
The formal model o f the single-factor repeated measures design is basically the
same as the randomized block model with random block effects. The subjects serve as
the blocks in this case. This model is used to analyze the data collected from each o f
the three data sets. Each data set is analyzed separately. The model is formulated as
follows:
( 3 t )
where:
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Y4 is the perceived auditor financial liability for the ith scenario by the jth
subject
p. is a constant
Pi are independent subject effects
following the N(0, o2„)
Zj are constants representing scenario effects subject to Szj = 0
e® are independent N(0, a2) and is written, using such notation, as no
replications are present in the design
p{ and eg, are independent
i=  l,...,n; j  = l ,—,r
n = sample size for each group (jurors, bankers, or CPAs)
r = 7 (the normal audit and the six behavioral situations)
As mentioned earlier, a primary purpose o f this analysis is to determine whether 
there are statistically significant differences between the mean response o f the normal 
audit and the mean responses o f each o f the six behavioral audit situations. The mean 
response o f the normal audit situation was expected to be the minimum financial 
liability as perceived by the subjects. Audit situations that exceeded this level indicated 
that the behavior under study increases the perceptions of auditor’s financial liability. 
The null hypothesis for this analysis is as follows:
H,: Tl = T ,  =  T1 = T4 = t 5 = t s = 0
H.: Not all t, equal zero
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The data was organized, as shown in Table 1, for processing using the SAS 
(Statistical Analysis System) software package. Procedure GLM was employed in this 
regard.
Table 1
Configuration o f the Data in SAS
Auditor Behaviors
The test statistic utilized in evaluating the hypotheses (see Neter, Wasserman, 
and Kutner, 1990, p. 1040) is the F* statistic given
MSTRF '  =
MSTR.S
where:
MSTR = mean treatment sum o f squares
MSTR.S = mean interaction sum o f squares between 
subjects and treatments
(3.2)
The decision rule is:
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If F* s Tabulated F[1 - o; r-l, (r-lXn-1)], conclude Ho
If F* > Tabulated F[1 - a; r-l, (r-lXn-I)], conclude H,
If  the above test resulted in rejection o f the null hypothesis, at least one factor 
level effect was statistically different from zero. Follow-up analysis was conducted 
utilizing the Bonferroni method o f multiple comparison to estimate the pairwise 
comparisons between the normal audit and each o f the six behavioral situations. This 
contrast procedure indicates, at the family confidence level o f 0.95, differences in mean 
responses. This analysis provides information about the differences in mean responses 
between the normal audit and each o f the six behavioral audit situations.
The single-factor repeated measures design is subject to certain assumptions. 
One of the main assumptions is that there is no interaction between subjects and 
treatments, implying that the model is additive. To examine the appropriateness o f this 
assumption, the Tukey Test for Additivity was conducted (Neter, Wasserman, and 
Kutner, 1990, p. 790). If  there was interaction between subjects and treatments, a 
possible remedy would be to apply an appropriate transformation to the actual response 
data, Y*.
Another important assumption holds that “any two Y, treatment observations 
for a given subject are correlated in the same fashion for all subjects. This key 
assumption implies,. . . ,  that the variance-covariance matrix o f the observations Y* for 
any given subject has compound symmetry” (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1990, p. 
1038). The assumption o f compound symmetry in the additive model (3.1) is
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restricted. While this assumption is sufficient so that the F* statistic for testing 
treatment effects will follow the F distribution when Ho holds (i.e., when no treatment 
effects are present), the assumption is not necessary. For this purpose it would suffice 
that the condition of sphericity be met (Neter Wasserman, and Kutner, 1990, p. 957). 
The condition o f sphericity requires that the variance o f the difference between any two 
estimated treatment means be constant, that is:
o2(Y., - Y./) = constant, j  * j '
The Hartley Test for equality o f variances (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 
1990, p. 619) was used to determine whether the condition of sphericity is met.
Rank Order o f Audit Situations
In addition to evaluating the contrasts between the normal audit and each o f the 
six behavioral scenarios, each group’s perception of the rank order o f the audit 
situations is o f interest. To assess the agreement among the three groups, the means of 
financial liability o f the seven scenarios for each group were first ranked in an ascending 
order. Kendall’s coefficient o f concordance W was computed afterwards using the 
following formula (Conover, 1980, p. 305).
(3.3)
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where:
R-j = the sum o f the ranks for the jth scenario 
n = 3 (three subject groups) 
r = 7 (seven audit scenarios)
It is noted that the coefficient o f concordance W equals 0 if there is no 
agreement, and equals 1 if there is perfect agreement, that is, if all scenarios receive the 
same mean ranking. Furthermore, it can be shown that W is related to the 
nonparametric Friedman’s rank test statistic T for the audit situation effects through the 
following relationship (Gibbons, 1993, p.29)
W = (3-4)
« (r-l)  
where T is given by:
12T =
nrir+l) I *
-  3/i(r+l)
If there are no differences in audit situation effects, it can be shown that the T 
test statistic is distributed approximately as x2 with r-l degrees o f freedom (Neter, 
Wasserman, and Kutner, 1990, p. 948).
Accordingly, the null hypothesis o f no agreement between group rankings is 
rejected if T exceeds tabulated x3(l-« ; r-l) and is accepted if otherwise.
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A second test o f scenario ranking agreement between groups is conducted 
using the rank correlation test for agreement in multiple judgements reported in Kanji 
(1993, p .l 15). The purpose o f this test is to examine the significance o f the correlation 
between seven series o f rankings assigned to the seven financial liability means o f the 
three subject groups. This test is conducted through the use o f an F statistic. Upon 
ranking the financial liability of the seven scenarios means, the application o f this test 
entails computing the following quantities in sequence.
s  = nr(r2 -  1) 
12
Sq = Sum o f Squares o f Differences between scenario totals and their overall 
mean
D i = —n
D2 = S -  D v
Sl 7 T
s i  =
D-
n = 3 (three subject groups) 
r = 7 (seven scenarios)
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Finally, the F statistic is computed as S \/S \ and compared against tabulated 
F [l-a ; k-1, r(n-l)]. If calculated F exceeds the related tabulated critical value, the null 
hypothesis o f no agreement between group rankings is rejected.
Demographic and Socioeconomic 
Characteristics
Descriptive statistics obtained from the demographic and socioeconomic 
information contained on the last page o f the survey instrument is used in the analysis. 
The format of the two tables o f descriptive statistics are contained in Appendix A.
The format o f the descriptive statistics involving the dummy variables included 
in the demographic and socioeconomic questions are presented in Table A l, Appendix 
A. These statistics are organized by sample group with a summary column reflecting 
the total responses.
The format o f the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables included in 
the demographic and socioeconomic questions are formatted as in Table A2, Appendix 
A. These data are also organized by sample group with a summary column for total 
responses. This table also presents the ranges and averages for each o f the 
demographic variables.
Multiple Regression using 
QLS Model
A second analysis is conducted to explain the variability in responses among 
subjects. For example: do group membership, gender, marital status, household 
income, ethnicity, education, years o f employment, prior knowledge o f accounting and
Il
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auditing, or years since completion o f highest level o f education affect the respondent’s 
perceived auditor financial liability? Multiple regression using ordinary least squares is 
used to provide answers to the above questions. A separate regression equation is 
estimated for each o f the seven audit situations. The model is formulated as follows:
r 9 = p„ ♦ p ,x , ♦ p a  * P A  * M , -  P A  
* P A  ♦ P A  * P A  * P A  -  P iA o  + S  (3 5>
Where:
Ys = perceived auditor financial liability for the ith scenario by the jth subject
X, = 1 if  subject is juror, 0 otherwise
X, = 1 if  subject is banker, 0 otherwise
X, = 1 if gender male, 0 if female
X, = 1 if subject is married, 0 if not married
X, = 1 if  annual household income is less than $65,000, 0 otherwise
X, = 1 if subject is Caucasian-American, 0 otherwise
X  = 1 if subject has not completed a college education, 0 if otherwise
X  -  the years o f employment in current occupation
X  = the number of accounting or auditing courses completed
X , = the years since the completion o f the highest level of education
€ 8 are independent N(0,o*)
i = 1,..., 7 (the number o f scenarios)
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The multiple regression model is rich in that it incorporates group membership 
along with numerous demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that may explain 
the differences in perception among subjects. In those models where the parameters 
related to the jury and banker dummy variables are o f similar signs and significant, an 
additional test is conducted. A partial F test is used to determine whether the 
coefficients o f the jury and banker variables are equal. A reduced model is derived 
from the original full model (3.5), and is used in calculating the partial F test. The 
reduced model in this situation takes the following form when pt = P, = p.
Y = p0 + 3 (Xx * x2) * p3x 3 * p4*4 + p5x5
+ ^ 6^6 + ^ 7^7 + ^ 8^8 + ^ 9^9 + ^ 10^10 +
The null hypothesis in this case is:
Ho: P, = P,= P
and the alternative hypothesis is:
H.: P, # p2
The test statistic F* (see Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1990, p.99) is formulated as 
follows:
F* = SSE(R)-SSE(F) ^  SSE(F)
dfR ~<tfF dfF ( 3 6 )
I
j
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where:
SSE(R) and SSE(F) are the error sum o f squares for the reduced model and full 
models respectively.
dfR and d f are the degrees o f freedom associated with SSE(R) and SSE(F) 
respectively.
The decision rule is as follows:
I f  F* ^ Tabulated F(l-a; dfR-dfF, dfF), conclude Ho 
If  F* > Tabulated F (l-a; dfR-dfF, dfF), conclude H.
In testing each of the seven multiple regression models (3.5) for 
heteroskedasticity, the variance of the error term e,, denoted by a2, is assumed to be 
related to the continuous variables X«, X*, and Xl0 according to the following variance 
specification (Hill, Griffiths, & Judge, 1997, p. 229).
o’ = o2exp(alXg + a^ C9 + OjXl0) (3.7)
To test a null hypothesis of homoskedasticity against the alternative in equation
(3.7) the relevant hypotheses are:
H«: a, = Oj = ctj = 0, and 
H,: a , * 0, a , * 0, and/or a , * 0 
Note that when Ho is true, equation (3.7) reduces to o2 = o2
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To obtain an alternative test, one must begin by taking logarithms o f equation
(3.7) to yield the following:
ln(o,2) = o0 + axX% + o^T9 + clsX10 
where o0 = ln(o2)
Next, cj2j is replaced by the squared least squared residuals, e2, to  get the equation:
In («/) = «0 + a xX% + OyT9 + o^ri0 + v (3.8)
where v, is a usual error term introduced to allow for the fact that e*{ is being used as a 
proxy for o2.
Equation (3.8) is similar to a multiple regression equation. It has a dependent 
variable ln(e^, explanatory variables X,, X„ and Xl0, and unknown coefficients a„ a„ 
ctj, and a3.
If a statistically significant regression relationship exists between the dependent 
and independent variables related to (3.8), this would be an indication o f the presence 
o f heteroskedasticity; otherwise one could infer that the error terms in the original 
multiple regression models (3.S) are homoskedastic.
Finally, to test each o f the seven multiple regression models (3.5) for the 
normality of their error terms, the residuals ^  are first ordered in an ascending order 
based on their magnitudes. To find the expected values o f the ordered residuals under 
normality, w-, the following facts associated with ordinary least squares estimation are 
recognized: (1) the expected value o f the error terms for the regression model is zero,
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and (2) the standard deviation o f  the error terms is estimated by the square root o f the 
mean sum o f squares (JMSE) .
Statistical theory has shown that for a normal random variable with zero mean 
and estimated standard deviation o f ^ MSE, a good approximation o f the expected 
value o f the jth  ranked observation in a random sample of size n is given by :
where Z(A) denotes the (A) 100 percentile o f the standard normal distribution (Neter, 
Wasserman, and Kutner, 1990, p. 125).
Afterwards, one may compute the simple coefficient o f correlation p relating 
the residuals ^  to their expected values w; under normality. In this specific case, the 
formula for p is a simple one and is given by:
A large value o f p would indicate normality.
In summary, a single-factor repeated measures design is employed to analyze 
the mean responses to the seven audit situations within the subject groups. This 
examination provides information about the perceived auditor financial liability 
associated with each one o f the behaviors o f interest in this study necessary to validate 
the research hypotheses.
P = (3.9)
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Descriptive statistics are developed from the demographic and socioeconomic 
data collected in the instrument. This information is used to operationalize some o f the 
explanatory variables used in the regression analysis. These variables together with 
group membership dummy variables are used to explain the differences in responses to 
each o f the seven behavioral scenarios.
All o f these analyses were aimed at contrasting and explaining the perceptions 
of the three groups of subjects regarding auditor financial liability for the seven audit 
situations under scrutiny.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
The main findings reported herein will be shown to support the research 
hypotheses that there are differences in auditors’ financial liability between the normal 
audit situation and each of the six behavioral scenarios. The single-factor repeated 
measures design model reveals that the jurors perceived five o f the six behavioral 
scenarios as statistically significant at the a  = 0.01 level. The bankers identified three 
and the CPAs four behavioral scenarios as statistically significant at the a =  0.10 level 
or better.
The multiple regression models show among other things that the bankers held 
auditors to a higher standard. In all seven audit situations, the coefficients o f the 
dummy variable representing bankers were statistically significant different from zero at 
the level o f a  = 0.05. In addition, in the multiple regression model related to the audit 
fees (B3), the coefficient of the juror variable was also statistically significant at the a -  
0.05 level. The coefficients for these two variables were found to be equal.
Other explanatory variables that were also significant in some scenarios include 
educational level, ethnic background, and number o f accounting and/or auditing 
courses completed.
63
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Responses to Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument was pilot tested by accounting students and faculty in 
the College o f Business at Eastern New Mexico University. The participants identified 
language and format that was ambiguous. Based on the comments and suggestions 
from these preliminary subjects, several modifications were made to the instrument to 
improve the clarity of the questions. In particular, several students suggested that an 
example o f a hand-prepared response be included in the survey. This turned out to be a 
very useful suggestion in that it eliminated one source of possible confusion as to the 
expected form o f response.
The survey instruments were administered to 77 members o f an impaneled jury. 
O f this total, ten of the forms were incomplete and therefore unusable in conducting the 
analysis. The remaining 67 survey instruments are used in conducting the within group 
analysis (single-factor repeated measures design) and between group analysis (multiple 
regression analysis).
At approximately the same time that the impaneled jury participated in the 
study, the survey instruments were mailed to the bankers and CPAs. In addition to the 
survey instrument, the mailed package included an instructional cover letter, a $1 bill as 
a symbolic compensation for the effort required to complete the form, and a self- 
addressed, stamped post card so that the respondents could request the results o f the 
completed research. There were 126 bankers selected from the New Mexico Banking 
Association membership roster. These reflect all o f the loan officer members in the 
State o f New Mexico. Two o f the packages were undeliverable. Of the 59 survey
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
forms that were returned, two were incomplete. The remaining 57 survey forms were 
used in the analyses. This reflects a 47 percent response rate.
There were 125 CPAs in the data base, representing members o f the New 
Mexico Society o f CPAs practicing in the eastern portion o f the state. One package 
was undeliverable, leaving a total sample of 124 members. There were 45 usable 
responses received from the CPA subjects. This reflects a 36 percent response rate. 
Table 2 contains a complete description o f the administration o f the survey forms to the 
three groups o f subjects.
Table 2
Administration o f Survey Instruments
Subjects
Delivered
Forms
Total
Responses
Usable 
I Responses
Response 
1 Bate
Jurors 77 77 67 100%
Bankers 124 59 57 47%
CPAs 124 45 45 36%
The response rates for the bankers and CPAs were considerably better than 
expected. In attitude research in accounting, response rates o f 10 to 20 percent are 
typical (Wilson, 1987). The survey instrument for this study was mailed to 
professionals who have a vested interest in the financial reporting system. The 
incorporation of incentives to encourage the bankers and CPAs to complete the survey 
instrument appears to have achieved the desired effect (Bouchard, 1976, p. 383). The
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survey instrument was administered during tax season, possibly explaining the relatively 
lower response rate among CPAs.
To evaluate the reliability o f the measuring instrument used in this study, the 
items (behavioral scenarios) were checked by coefficient alpha and split-half analysis 
(Peter, 1979). Alpha coefficients were .8057, .7508, and .8824 for jurors, bankers, and 
CPAs respectively. Upon discarding the normal audit (NA) and dividing the six 
remaining scenarios into two equal groups, the total score on even items (scenarios B2, 
B4, and B6) and the total score on odd items (scenarios B l, B3, and B5) are 
correlated. The simple correlation coefficient p for the jurors, bankers, and CPAs were 
.6509, .5696, and .7316 respectively. These results reveal that the scales items exhibit 
a reasonable level of internal consistency reliability for an exploratory study such as this 
one. Reliabilities in excess o f .60 generally are regarded as sufficient for research 
purposes. (Nullally, 1967).
In testing for nonresponse bias, late respondents were used as a proxy for 
nonrespondents. For each group, t-tests were conducted to determine whether there 
were statistically significant differences between early and late respondents. The 
presence o f significant differences would indicate that the two subgroups o f subjects 
are different. Such differences may suggest that nonrespondents are also different, thus 
limiting the generalizability of the results.
To test for the presence o f the differences mentioned above, the respondents 
were divided into two subgroups. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the median 
date o f receipt was used as the dividing line between early and late responses. For the
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bankers, 23 o f the responses were assigned to group 1 and the remaining 34 were 
assigned to group 2. For the CPAs, 21 o f the responses were assigned to group 1 and 
the remaining 24 were assigned to group 2. Tables C l and C2 in Appendix C contain 
the detailed S AS printouts for each o f the subject groups.
Table 3 contains a summary o f the results for the bankers. There are no 
significant differences between the two subgroups for the normal audit or the six 
behavioral scenarios (minimum P-value > 0.1264). Therefore, the inference may be 
made that the nonrespondents do not differ significantly from the bankers who 
completed the survey instrument.
Table 3
Summary o f Early vs. Late Responses for Bankers
Scenario
Means | Test Statistic P-value
Group 1 I Group 2 1 T Pr > |T|
NA 24.2609 30.7059 -0.8419 0.4035
B1 41.6522 40.7059 0.1280 0.8986
B2 44.0000 36.7353 0.9501 0.3462
B3 40.5217 40.8235 -0.0355 0.9718
B4 49.4783 45.1765 0.4984 0.6202
BS 30.8696 44.3235 -1.5519 0.1264
B6 34.1739 37.4706 -0.3858 0.7011
Table 4 contains a similar summary analysis for the CPAs. Again, the 
differences between early and late respondents are not statistically significant (minimum
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P-value > 0.1008). The inference may be made that there is no significant difference 
between nonrespondents and CPA subjects who completed the survey instrument.
Table 4
Summary o f Early vs. Late Responses for CPAs
1
Scenario
NA
Means Test Statistic P-value |
Group I I Group 2 T P r > m  1 
0.100825.2381 11.4167 1.6975
B1 29.0952 22.9167 0.7054 0.4861
B2 40.7143 27.0000 1.6945 0.1726
B3 41.5714 26.8333 1.5328 0.1326
B4 33.9524 27.2917 0.7101 0.4815
B5 32.5238 27.8333 0.4502 0.6548
B6 37.8095 25.2083 1.3216 0.1935
Sincle-Factor Repeated Measures
Utilizing the data from each o f the subject groups, the single-factor repeated 
measures models (3.1) were estimated. The purpose of this analysis is to determine for 
each subject group, whether there are statistically significant differences between the 
mean response of the normal audit and the six behavioral audit situations (the seven 
scenarios). Table S contains a summary of the F Values for the three subject groups. 
In each subject group analysis the model is significant at better than the a  = 0.05 level. 
Specifically, a significant portion o f the variation is explained by the scenarios in each 
one o f the models. The complete ANOVA tables for each of the three subject groups
|I
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are included in Appendix C (jurors: Table C3, bankers: Table C4, and CPAs: Table 
C5).
Tables
Summary of F Values for Scenarios
I Subject Groups F Value I Prob > F 1
Jurors 13.44 0.0001
Bankers 8.60 0.0001
CPAs 4.41 0.0003
As indicated in the previous chapter, before interpreting the results it is 
necessary to assess the appropriateness o f the model for these data sets. There are two 
assumptions that need to be examined. The first assumption is that there is no 
interaction between the treatments (scenarios) and the subjects.
For each type o f respondent, the Tukey Test for Additivity was used to 
determine whether there is interaction between the scenarios and the subjects. The 
formulation o f the model being tested contains an interaction term, Da,Pi as presented 
below:
YiS = P + «, + P, + + S  (4.1)
where:
Y, is perceived auditor financial liability for the hh scenario by the jth  subject, 
is a constant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
<ti are constants subject to the restriction I! a, — 0
pj are constants subject to the restriction 2  ft = 0
D is a constant
e„ are independent N(0,o2)
i= l,...,n ;j = l,...,r
The test statistic for this model is an F* test where:
/r* -  SSAB* ^  SSRem*
1 m -r-n
where:
SSAB* = Y l P 2a * $  =
1 W,-yfWryJ
SSTO = SSA + SSB + SSAB* + SSRem*
with:
SSTO given as the total sum o f squares 
SSA given as the sum o f squares for scenarios 
SSB given as the sum of squares for subjects
so that:
SSRem* = SSTO - SSA - SSB - SSAB* 
r = 7 (the normal audit and six behavioral situations) 
n = number of subjects (67 for jurors, 57 for bankers, and 45 for CPAs)
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The tabulated F is determined as
F (l-a; 1, r n-r-n)
and in this case a  is chosen to be equal to 0.05.
The null hypothesis for the above model is as follows:
H„: D = 0 (no interactions present)
H.: D * 0 (interactions Dc^P, present)
The decision rule is as follows:
If F* s  Tabulated F (l-a; 1, r  n-r-n), Conclude H,
If F* > Tabulated F (l-a; 1, r n-r-n), Conclude H.
Details about the above test may be found in Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1990, 
p.790).
Table 6 contains the results o f the Tukey Test for Additivity for each one o f the 
subject groups. The details are contained in Tables B l, B2, and B3 in Appendix B.
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Summary ofTukey Tests for Additivity
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Jurors:
F* = 22.81 > F[0.95; 1, 395] = 3.84
.-. Conclude H,, there is interaction between scenarios and jurors at the a  = 0.05 
level.
Bankers:
F* = 0.3311 < F[0.95; 1, 335] = 3.84
.-. Conclude Ho, there is no interaction between scenarios and bankers at the a = 0.05 
level.
CPAs:
F* = 0.6346 < F[0.95; 1,263] = 3.84
.-. Conclude Ho, there is no interaction between scenarios and CPAs at the a  = 0.05 
level.
The null hypothesis is rejected for the juror group. This data set contains 
interaction between the treatments (scenarios) and the juror subjects. A  possible 
remedy involves an appropriate transformation o f the original data set o f jurors. This 
was accomplished by transforming each observation Y, to LN(1 + Y^). After 
transforming the data in this fashion, Table 7 demonstrates that the data set o f jurors 
meets the criteria o f the Tukey Test for Additivity. The details are contained in Table 
B4 in Appendix B.
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Table 7
Tukey Test for Additivity: Transformation 
o f Juror Data to LN(1+Yg)
Jurors fLNn+YyYI:
F* = 3.187 < F[0.95; 1, 395] = 3.84
Conclude Ho, there is no interaction between scenarios and jurors at the a — 0.05 
level.
Based on this result the juror data set will be in this configuration for the 
remainder o f the analysis using the single-factor repeated measures model.
For the banker and CPAs subject groups the test results in a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis. There does not appear to be interaction present in these data sets (see 
Table 6).
The second assumption holds that “any two Ys treatment observations for a 
given subject are correlated in the same fashion for all subjects” (Neter, Wasserman, 
and Kutner, 1990, p. 1038). As discussed in the previous chapter, it is sufficient that 
the condition o f sphericity be met. This condition requires that the variance o f the 
difference between any two estimated treatment means be constant, that is:
oJ(Y.j - Y.,') = constant, j * j '
Note that for r = 7, there are 21 differences among the means that need to be 
considered.
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The Hartley Test for equality o f variances (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 
1990, p. 619) was used to determine whether the condition o f sphericity is met. The 
null hypothesis for this test is as follows:
Ho. a \  = a \  = o2, = ... = o221 
H,: Not all a \ are equal
The test statistic used to test this hypothesis is the H* statistic given by:
H* = Max (s2)-  ^Min (s2)
The decision rule is as follows:
If H* <; Tabulated H, Conclude Ho 
If  H* > Tabulated H, Conclude H,
Where:
Tabulated H = H (l-a; q, df), and 
d f=n- l  
q = 21
df = 66 for jurors 
d f = 56 for bankers 
d f=  44 for CPAs
Note that a  is chosen to be 0.01 because only large differences among variances need 
to be detected.
. 1
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Table 8 contains the results o f this test for each o f the data sets. The condition 
o f sphericity is met in all three data sets. The details are contained in Tables B5, B6, 
and B7 in Appendix B.
Table 8
Summary of Hartley Test for Equal Variances
Jurors: LNfl+Yl
H* = 3.278195 * H(0.99; 21, 66) = 3.2
Conclude H„ the data indicates that the treatment variances are equal at the a  =
0.01 level.
Bankers:
H* = 2.3936 < H(0.99; 21, 56) = 3.5
Conclude H„ the data indicates that the treatment variances are equal at the a =
0.01 level.
CPAs:
H* = 3.4997 < H(0.99; 21,44) = 4.2
Conclude H„ the data indicates that the treatment variances are equal at the o =
0.01 level.
After the transformation of the juror data set, the appropriateness o f the single­
factor repeated measures model (3.1) has been demonstrated for all three data sets. 
Table 9 contains the F Values for the transformed juror data set and the original data 
sets for bankers and CPAs to be used in the analysis. The ANOVA table for 
transformed juror data is contained in Table C6 Appendix C.
.1
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Table 9
Summary of F Values for Scenarios (Transformed Juror Data)
F Value Prob > F
Jurors 12.58 0.0001
Bankers 8.60 0.0001
CPAs 4.41 0.0003
As discussed in Chapter 3, the null hypothesis for the above model is that the 
treatment effects are all equal to zero. The F* statistic provides the test for this 
hypothesis. In each data set the F* statistic, which is displayed as the F Value for the 
scenarios, is statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level. Therefore, not all 
treatment effects are equal to zero. At least one treatment effect is statistically different 
from zero in each data set.
The Bonferroni method o f multiple comparison is applied as a follow up 
procedure to estimate the pairwise comparisons between the normal audit and each of 
the six behavioral situations. The contrast procedure will indicate, at the family 
confidence level of 0.95, significant differences in mean responses. The results of this 
analysis is discussed separately for each subject group. Tables B8 through B 10 in 
Appendix B contain the analyses o f the contrasts between the normal audit and each of 
the sue behavioral scenarios for each o f the subject groups. Statistically significant 
contrasts indicate that the subjects attributed a greater degree o f financial responsibility 
to the auditor than exists in the normal audit. The tables provide contrasts at a  = 0.01,
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O.OS, and 0.10. The results are consistent among all three family confidence levels. 
The question numbers listed in the tables correspond to the normal audit and the 
behavioral scenarios as follows:
Question Behavior
1 NA: Normal Audit
2 B l: Auditor Advocacy
3 B2: Management Advisory Services
4 B3: Audit Fees
5 B4: Cross-hiring o f Audit Personnel
6 B5: Co-Contracting Between Auditor and Client
7 B6: Management Fraud
Table 10 contains a list of the means o f the six contrasts together with their 
estimates in descending order. The contrasts are made against behavioral scenario NA 
(normal audit) which has a mean of 1.6749. In Table 10 for example represents the 
mean response related to the normal audit scenario (NA), averaged over all juror 
subjects. The juror subjects perceived that behavioral scenarios B5, B l, B4, B2, and 
B3 (co-contracting between auditor and client, auditor advocacy, cross-hiring o f audit 
personnel, management advisory services, and audit fees) involved an increase in 
auditor financial liability. The related contrasts for these scenarios were statistically 
significant at the a  = 0.01 family confidence level. The only behavioral scenario that 
was not perceived to increase financial liability was B6 (management fraud). The
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contrast for management fraud (ji^ * Una) failed to be statistically significant at a  =
0.10, the highest family confidence level analyzed. Table B8 in Appendix B contains a 
complete analysis o f the contrasts related to jurors at all three family confidence levels.
Table 10
Summary o f Bonferroni Test o f Contrasts for Jurors
I Contrast I Estimate I Significance Level I
P a s  _  U na 1.4461 a  = 0.01
P b i  " U n a 1.1055 a  = 0.01
P b4 "  M-n a 1.0705 a  = 0.01
P m - P n a 1.0419 a  = 0.01
P b j "  U n a 0.7910 a  = 0.01
P b6 “  U na 0.2818 not significant
The bankers identified fewer contrasts as statistically significant. Table 11 
contains a list of the six contrasts together with their estimates in descending order. 
Behavioral scenario NA, (normal audit) has a mean of 28.10S3 which forms the basis 
o f the contrasts. The behavioral scenarios BS, B I, and B6 (co-contracting between 
auditor and client, auditor advocacy, management fraud) were perceived by the bankers 
to involve increased financial liability for the auditor. Unlike the juror subjects, the 
bankers perceived the management fraud contrasts as statistically significant. As 
financial statement users, bankers attribute increased financial responsibility to auditors 
as a result o f management fraud. The contrasts between the normal audit and
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behavioral scenarios B4, B2, and B3 (cross-hiring o f audit personnel, management 
advisory services, and audit fees) are not statistically significant at a  = 0.10 family 
confidence level, the highest level analyzed. The banker subjects perceive no difference 
between these behavioral situations and the normal audit. Table B9 in Appendix B 
contains a complete analysis o f the contrasts related to bankers at all three family 
confidence levels.
Table 11
Summary of Bonferroni Test o f Contrasts for Bankers
I Contrast I Estimate I Significance Level I
Pbs - H*A 24.6667 a = 0 .0 1
P bi -  Una 18.5088
ooIIa
He* - UkA 16.0526 a = 0 .0 1
P w - P nA 9.6842 not significant
Pb2 '  P n a 4.3509 not significant
P b i - P na 1.5088 not significant
The summary o f the Bonferroni test o f contrasts for the CPAs is contained in 
Table 12. The contrasts are listed based on the descending order o f their estimates. 
Consistent with prior research, the CPAs fail to perceive the increased financial liability 
associated with most o f the behavioral scenarios. The mean o f normal audit for this 
subject group is 17.8667, which provides the basis for the contrasts. These subjects 
identified behavioral scenarios BS and B l (co-contracting between auditor and client,
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and auditor advocacy) as involving increased financial liability for the auditor. The 
related contrasts are statistically significant at the o  = 0.01 family confidence level. 
These two behavioral scenarios have been extensively discussed in the professional 
literature, which might increase the accounting professional’s sensitivity to such 
situations. The contrasts o f behavioral scenarios - p*A and fxM - p„A (audit fees and 
management fraud) are statistically significant at the a  = 0.10 family confidence level, 
the highest level analyzed. Behavioral scenarios pM - p*A and pM - p ^  related to cross- 
hiring of audit personnel and management advisory services are not statistically 
significant at a  = 0.10 family confidence level, the highest level of analysis. The CPAs 
perceived no increased financial liability associated with these behavioral scenarios. 
Table B10 in Appendix B contains a complete analysis o f the contrasts related to CPAs 
at all three family confidence levels.
Table 12
Summary o f Bonferroni Test o f Contrasts for CPAs
1 Contrast I Estimate I Significance Level |
P bs “ M-na 20.1333 a  = 0 .0 1
P bi “ P na 17.8000 a  = 0 .0 1
P bj "  P na 11.6567 a  = 0 .1 0
Pb6 '  PNA 11.3778 a  =  0 .1 0
PB4 " PNA 8.5333 not significant
P b2 “ P n a 7.7111 not significant
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In summary, it appears that the jurors perceived that all contrasts except for 
management fraud pw - |im were statistically significant at the a  -  0.01 level.
As financial statement users, bankers had a different perspective. This subject 
group attributed increased financial liability to the auditors for behavioral scenarios 
involving co-contracting between auditor and client, auditor advocacy, and 
management fraud at the a  = 0.01 level. The remainder o f the behavioral scenarios 
were not perceived to involve any more audit financial liability than that related to the 
normal audit. The inclusion o f management fraud (p* - pKJ  as a statistically significant 
contrast indicates that the bankers hold the auditor liable for failing to discover and 
report management misconduct. In the sequential order in which litigation progresses, 
bankers would hold the auditor more responsible than in the normal audit, but jurors 
would not likely find the auditor more responsible for detecting and reporting on 
management fraud.
As a surrogate for financial statement preparers, the CPAs identified only two 
behavioral scenarios as differing significantly from the normal audit at the a  = 0.01 
level. Most o f the behaviors associated with the scenarios were not considered a 
compromise of auditor independence. The two contrasts that were statistically 
significant were co-contracting between auditor and client (pM - pKA) and auditor 
advocacy (pBI - It is interesting to note that all three subject groups identified 
these two behavioral scenarios as statistically significant contrasts.
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Rank Order o f Audit Situations
Each subject group has ranked the scenarios in a slightly different order. 
Although the ranking appears to be relatively consistent, it is important to test the 
assumption that agreement exists among such rankings. The first test used to test this 
assumption is the Friedman Rank Test (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1990, p. 948). 
Based on the analysis provided in Table B l 1, Appendix B, the calculated T value from 
formula (3.4) is 15.1429. The tabulated value o f x*[0.95,6] is 12.59. These results 
suggest an agreement between group rankings.
The Kendall’s coefficient o f concordance, W, which measures the agreement in 
rankings within the subject groups, is computed in Table B12 in Appendix B using 
formula (3.3). Its value is 0.8413, which is quite close to the ideal value o f 1.
The results o f the rank correlation test reported in Kanji (1993, p. 115) are 
shown in Table B 13, Appendix B. The F* o f 12.37 is greater than the tabulated F of 
2.85. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis o f agreement between group rankings is 
accepted.
In short, the above analyses reported so far confirm the research hypotheses 
that the behavioral scenarios increase the financial liability of auditors over the normal 
audit situation. Each one o f the subject groups perceived some o f the behavioral 
scenario contrasts as statistically significant. At least one o f the groups identified each 
of the behaviors as increasing financial liability for the auditor. Furthermore, even for 
the few contrasts that were not statistically significant, the mean perceived financial
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liability was always greater than that for the normal audit, irrespective o f the type o f 
behavioral scenario or the subject group.
Demographic and Socioeconomic 
Characteristics
There were 169 respondents, o f which 113 answered all o f the demographic 
and socioeconomic questions. The descriptive statistics are presented in Tables B 14 
and BIS in Appendix B. Table B14 contains the descriptive statistics for the dummy 
variables included in the demographic and socioeconomic questions. These data are 
organized by subject group with a summary for the 113 observations. Table BIS 
reflects descriptive statistics for the continuous variables included in the demographic 
and socioeconomic questions. These data are also organized by sample group with a 
summary reflecting the total for the 113 observation. This table also presents the 
ranges and averages for each demographic or socioeconomic variable.
An analysis will be conducted below to shed more light on the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics related to the samples of the three subject groups. Table 
13 is a summary o f Chi-Square tests conducted on the contingency tables depicted in 
Table B14 in Appendix B.
Based on the findings in Table 13 it appears that the composition o f the 
impaneled jury was different than that of the bankers and CPAs in terms o f gender, 
annual household income, and education. A visual inspection of the descriptive 
statistics in Table B14 in Appendix B indicates that a larger portion of the juror 
subjects were female, whereas most of the banker and CPA subjects were male. The
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majority o f the jurors had an annual household income o f less than $65,000. A large 
portion o f the banker and CPA subjects had annual household incomes greater than 
$65,000. As professionals, most o f the bankers and CPAs had completed a  college 
education, whereas a majority o f the juror subjects had not completed college.
Table 13
Summary o f Chi-Square Calculations for Contingency Tables
I Variable I Chi-Square I P-value |
Gender 25.159 0.001
Marital Status 0.627 0.731
Annual Household Income 24.889 0.001
Ethnicity 1.983 0.371
Education 39.769 0.001
Table 14
Summary o f F Values for Three Single-Factor ANOVA
I Variable
Years o f employment 0.000
I P-value | 
0.9966
Years since completion of education 4.782 0.0108
Number o f accounting/auditing courses 42.44 0.0001
With respect to the continuous variables summarized in Table B15, the number 
of years since completion o f the highest level o f education (YRSED) and the number o f 
accounting and auditing courses completed (COURSES) are statistically significant at
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the 0.05 level. Table 14 contains a summary of the F values related to the single-factor 
ANOVAs related to the different continuous variables. Details o f the conducted 
analysis are found in Table C7 in Appendix C.
As would be expected, the CPA subjects had completed considerably more 
accounting and auditing courses than had the bankers or jurors. The years since 
completion of the highest level o f education (YRSED) was greatest for the juror 
subject groups. Less than 25% o f these subjects had completed a college education.
So it appears, all things being equal, that jurors have entered the work force earlier in 
life.
The juror subjects represent a cross-section of the local population. As a 
group, there is cultural and economic diversity, which is what one would expect for a 
randomly selected impartial jury.
The apparent homogeneity of the banker subjects and CPA subjects is the result 
o f two factors. First, they completed a college education as part o f the entrance 
requirements to the profession. Second, their career paths provide annual income 
greater than might be expected from the general population. It is interesting to note 
that most of these professionals are males. From a national perspective, both banking 
and public accounting are more evenly represented by men and women. This 
aberration may reflect the rural setting from which the sample was drawn.
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Multiple Regression Model 
I rtilizinp OLS
The demographic and socioeconomic information contained in the above tables 
are used to estimate a multiple regression equation for each o f the audit scenarios. The 
purpose o f this analysis is to determine which of the explanatory variables make a 
statistically significant contribution to the variability in responses. The ANOVA table 
for each of the audit scenarios is analyzed separately.
Each o f the seven multiple regression models contain ten explanatory variables. 
As described in Chapter 3, there are seven dummy and three continuous variables. The 
combination o f these variables contributes to the richness o f the models. Table 15 
contains summary statistics o f the seven multiple regression models. The detailed 
ANOVA tables for each model is included in Table C8 Appendix C.
Table 15
Summary Statistics o f Multiple Regression Models
Dependent
Variable
| Mean 1 Number of Significant Variables 
1 at .10 Level
R-Square
NA 17.9115 2 0.2039
B l 32.9204 2 0.1628
B2 31.0531 1 0.1001
B3 34.0974 3 0.1144
B4 32.6903 1 0.1308
B5 34.3717 1 0.0606
B6 36.0354 1 0.0658
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For all seven o f the models the dummy variable, Banker, is statistically 
significant at the a  -  0.10 level or better. The sign o f the parameter estimate is positive 
in all seven cases. The implication is that bankers as a subject group significantly 
contribute to increased auditor financial liability in each behavioral scenario.
In the multiple regression model that analyzes the normal audit (NA), two 
dummy variables are statistically significant. Membership in the subject group o f 
bankers positively contributes 15.04 percentage points to the mean response above the 
base line (CPAs). This is different from zero at the statistically significant level o f a  = 
0.0315. In addition, in this model the dummy variable for ethnicity provides a negative 
contribution to the mean response in the model. The value o f this parameter is >9.78 
and is significant at the a  = 0.0627 level. It appears that the ethnicity variable, 
Caucasian, reduces the mean response o f the model by 9.78 percentage points below 
the base line (non-Caucasian). Caucasian subjects hold the auditor to a lower level of 
financial culpability than other subjects o f different ethnic background.
The multiple regression model for auditor advocacy (B l) also involves two 
statistically significant dummy explanatory variables. The banker variable positively 
contributes 24.26 percentage points to the mean response o f the model at the a  = 
0.0054 level of significance. “Less than a college education” is the second positive 
dummy variable that is significant. The lack o f a college education contributes 13.27 
percentage points to the mean response o f the model at the a  = 0.0620 level of 
significance. Participants who have not completed a college education hold the auditor
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to a higher level o f financial responsibility than do those who have completed a college 
degree.
In the model for management advisory services (B2), bankers is the only 
explanatory variable that is statistically significant. The parameter estimate in this 
model is positive, contributing 25.58 percentage points to the mean response o f the 
model above the base line (CPAs). This parameter is statistically significant at the a  = 
0.0060 level. Bankers appear to attribute significantly more liability to the auditor than 
the other two groups when management advisory services are also being provided by 
the public accounting firm.
The model that analyzes the perceived financial liability o f audit fees (B3) 
contains three statistically significant variables. The continuous variable, Courses, 
reflects the number of accounting or auditing courses that have been completed by the 
subject. It is interesting to note that the sign o f the related estimated parameter is 
positive and is significant at the a = 0.0636 level. As with all o f the models, the 
bankers variable is significant at the a  = 0.0080 level and the associated estimated 
parameter is positive and equal to 26.3878. The other dummy variable o f jurors is also 
statistically significant at the a  = 0.0281 level and the associated estimated parameter is 
positive and equal to 25.2311. As discussed in Chapter 3, a partial F test is conducted 
to determine whether the parameters associated with the bankers and the jurors groups 
are equal in this model. The ANOVA table for the related reduced model is located in 
Table C9, in Appendix C.
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The partial F test is computed using formula (3.6) from the information 
depicted in Table C8, associated with dependent variable (B3), and Table C9 as 
follows:
Fm = (99079.63728 -  99064.69610) ^  99064.69610 
(103 -  102) 102
r  14.94 F* =
971.2225 
F* = 0.0154
The Tabulated F[0.95; 1, 102] is 3.9173.
These findings imply that there is no difference between the regression 
coefficients for jurors and bankers at the a  = 0.05 level o f significance. The subject 
group CPAs is not significant, given that both jurors and bankers are in the multiple 
regression model.
The multiple regression model for the cross-hiring o f audit personnel (B4) 
contains the banker variable as the only statistically significant explanatory variable. In 
this model the banker parameter is significant at the a  = 0.0095 level and is positive. It 
contributes 24.9417 percentage points to the mean response of the model above the 
base line (CPAs). As in all o f the other models, bankers attribute more financial 
liability to the behavioral situation where there is cross-hiring of auditing personnel by 
the audit client, than do the other two groups.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
In the behavioral scenario o f co-contracting between auditor and client (B5), 
the banker variable is again the only statistically significant variable. In this model the 
parameter estimate is positive and significant at the a  = 0.0S47 level. It contributes 
20.1762 percentage points to the mean response o f the model above the base line 
(CPAs).
In the final behavioral scenario management fraud (B6), the banker variable is 
the only statistically significant variable, hi this model the parameter estimate is 
positive and significant at the a  = 0.0503 level. It contributes 19.2963 percentage 
points to the mean response of the model above the base line (CPAs).
Finally, in evaluation of the appropriateness o f each of the seven multiple 
regression models (3.5) the simple correlation coefficient p between the actual residuals 
and their expected values under normality is computed using formula (3.9). Table 16 
indicates that the values o f p were quite high and ranging between 0.9609 for scenario 
NA (normal audit) and 0.9880 for scenario B1 (auditor advocacy). Therefore, it is 
concluded that the assumption of the normality o f the error terms appears to be 
supported.
Table 16
Simple Correlation Coefficient Between Residuals 
and Their Expected Values Under Normality
1 Scenario 1 NA 1 B1 1 B2 1. B3_ _ H B4 1 B5 0 B6
P 0.9609 0.9880 0.9847 0.9778 0.9832 0.9721 1 0.9826
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In testing for the presence o f heteroskedasticity, equation (3.8) has been 
estimated using ordinary least squares for each o f the seven scenarios. Except for 
model (85), the relatively large P-values reported in table CIO in Appendix C for the 
calculated F statistics indicate that the null hypothesis a t = a* = a, = 0 cannot be 
rejected for any of the remaining six models at the a  = 0.05 level of significance. These 
findings also show that the assumption of the constancy o f the error variance is 
reasonable.
hi summary, each o f the seven multiple regression models indicates that the 
banker dummy variable is statistically significant and in general has a larger positive 
impact on the dependent variables, than the other two groups o f subjects. In the 
normal audit scenario (NA), ethnicity is an additional significant factor. Caucasian 
subjects appear to negatively influence the mean response o f the model. The auditor 
advocacy scenario (B l) is positively influenced by those subjects who have not 
completed a college education. The audit fees scenario (B3) is positively influenced by 
bankers, jurors, and the number o f completed accounting or auditing courses. In 
addition, formal analyses pertaining to the residuals associated with each o f the above 
seven multiple regression models reveal that the assumptions o f normality of the error 
terms and the constancy of their variances are plausible.
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CHAFFERS
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary
A survey instrument was developed to elicit the opinions o f the subjects 
regarding auditor financial liability under a variety of behavioral scenarios. The 
behavioral scenarios were developed from the research literature on auditor 
independence. The focus of this study is on the connection between auditor culpability 
and auditor-auditee relationships that appear to compromise the appearance o f 
independence of the auditor.
The subjects included an impaneled jury, bank loan officers and CPAs. Two 
statistical models were used to analyze the data providing both within and between 
group analyses. The first type o f analysis aims at validating the research hypotheses HI 
through H6 depicted in the first chapter. The second type o f analysis aims at explaining 
the differences in perceived financial liability among all subjects for each o f the 
behavioral scenarios considered. The within group analysis was conducted by use o f a 
single-factor repeated measures design model for each group. All three o f the models 
were statistically significant at the a  = 0.05 level or better. To analyze the differences 
between the normal audit and the behavioral scenarios, the Bonferroni method of
92
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multiple comparisons was used. The results o f the jurors group indicated that five o f 
the six behavioral scenario contrasts were statistically significant at the a  = 0.01 level. 
The exception was management fraud (B6); jurors did not perceive that the auditor 
should be held financially more responsible than the normal audit (NA)under this 
circumstance.
Fewer behavioral scenario contrasts are statistically different in the bankers 
model. This subject group perceived co-contracting between auditor and client (B5), 
auditor advocacy 031) and management fraud (B6) to involve increased auditor 
financial culpability at the a = 0.01 level o f significance. The inclusion of management 
fraud as a significant contrast is an important finding. The management implications 
will be discussed in the final section o f this paper.
At the same level of significance, the CPAs identified two behavioral scenario 
contrasts that were significantly different from the normal audit. Co-contracting 
between auditor and client (B5) and auditor advocacy (Bl) were the two behavioral 
scenario contrasts that were statistically significant at the a = 0.01 level. Audit fees 
(B3) and management fraud (B6) were found to be statistically significant at the a  = 
0.10 level.
The scenarios were rank ordered by group according to the respective means o f 
financial responsibility. Two nonparametric statistical tests indicated that there was no 
difference between the three subject groups’ rankings; the subjects consistently ranked 
co-contracting between auditor and client (B5) and auditor advocacy (B1) in a similar
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fashion. All o f the subjects identified the normal audit (NA) as involving the least 
financial liability.
The between group analysis involved the use o f a series o f seven multiple 
regression models, one for each behavioral scenario. The overall results indicated that 
in the normal audit and the six behavioral scenarios, bankers attribute more financial 
responsibility to the auditor than do jurors or CPAs. The audit fees (B3) was the only 
behavioral scenario where jurors attributed more financial responsibility than CPAs.
In the normal audit model, Caucasian-American subjects attributed less financial 
responsibility to the auditor. With respect to the behavioral scenario o f auditor 
advocacy (B1), the lack o f a college education appears to positively influence the 
degree o f financial responsibility attributed to the auditor.
Both the jurors and bankers attributed increased financial responsibility to the 
auditor in the behavioral scenario that represents the financial liability related to the 
audit fee (B3). In addition, the more accounting and auditing courses completed by the 
subjects, the greater will be the perceived auditor financial responsibility for the 
behavioral scenarios o f management advisory services (B2) and the audit fees (B3).
Limitations
The typical caveat for survey research applies. In any survey instrument there 
are inherent limitations where the subject is asked to self-report. Numerous situational 
and/or emotional factors that exist at the time that the instrument is completed may 
affect the respondent’s perceptions. The brevity of the instrument leaves considerable
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opportunity for interpretation. The length o f the instrument was designed to elicit 
meaningful responses with the minimum time commitment on the part o f the subject. 
The instrument was pilot tested to remove as much ambiguity as possible.
The restricted geographic scope o f the study limits generalizability. All o f the 
subjects are residents o f Eastern New Mexico. This is a rural agricultural region o f the 
country that may not represent the cultural norms o f a more urban setting. Care must 
be taken in attempting to generalize the results to the larger population.
The response rates for the bankers and CPAs were better than expected. 
Although this increases the confidence in the results it does not eliminate possible 
nonresponse bias. If  those bankers and CPAs who failed to respond represent a 
different group o f professionals, then the conclusions drawn from this paper may be 
misleading. An attempt has been made to assess the impact o f nonresponse bias. The 
results of the performed analysis reveal that this issue is of minor concern as far as this 
study is concerned.
According to Palmrose (1991) disputes between auditors and their clients are 
disposed of in two ways. Most of these disputes are resolved in arbitration or settled 
prior to going to trial. For public image and cost containment reasons, CPA firms 
rarely choose to take a case to trial. Palmrose (1991) discovered that the 
characteristics o f these cases are significantly different that those that actually go to 
trial. Studying this subject from the perspective o f a jury trial may not capture the full 
nature of auditor’s financial liability.
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Finally, an important limitation involves the participation o f the jurors. The 
juror responses are being elicited from members o f an impaneled jury. The subjects did 
not receive instructions from the judge or listen to arguments and testimony from the 
plaintiff and defense and/or deliberate among themselves. The responses obtained in 
this research reflects the jurists’ predisposition to certain decisions prior to the trial 
experience. The responses to the behavioral scenarios may not reflect the true 
decisions that might be made under actual trial conditions.
Conclusions
It appears that this may be the first study to compare the perceptions of jurors, 
bankers and CPAs with respect to the financial culpability o f auditors in certain audit 
situations. In prior research on independence, the perceptions o f financial statement 
users were compared with that o f accounting professionals. Current research on 
hindsight bias has compared the perceptions o f judges and/or jurors to that o f 
accountants. In these studies accounting professionals have consistently attributed less 
importance to auditor-auditee relationships that might appear to be conflicts o f interest 
by third parties. The inclusion o f all three subject groups has provided a more 
comprehensive contrast: the bankers clearly attribute a greater degree of financial 
liability to auditors in all behavioral situations than do jurors or CPAs.
The results o f the analysis o f using the single-factor repeated measures design 
model indicates that the research hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence.
At least one subject group identified each of the behavioral scenarios as increasing the
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financial liability o f auditors over the normal audit situation. There were differences 
between the groups in both the degree o f financial liability attributed and the rank order 
o f the behavioral scenarios. The nonparametric tests used to examine the association 
among rankings confirm that there is agreement among the three groups.
The data indicate that bankers hold auditors to a much higher standard than do 
jurors or CPAs. To demonstrate this, Table 17 contains a comparative ranking o f 
means o f perceived financial liability in descending order o f their magnitude for the 
normal audit and the six behavioral scenarios by each group.
Table 17 
Comparative Ranking o f Means
Jurors H Bankers 1 CP J 1
Scenario I Means Scenario I Means I Scenario I Means |
B5 41.58 B5 52.77 B5 38.00
B1 34.27 B1 46.61 B1 35.67
B4 32.37 B6 44.16 B3 29.53
B2 30.11 B4 37.79 B6 29.24
B3 24.84 B2 32.46 B4 26.40
B6 22.79 B3 29.61 B2 25.58
NA 12.60 NA 28.11 NA 17.87
Financial statement users rely on the financial statements to make investment 
and lending decisions. This group clearly assigns more responsibility to the auditor as 
part o f the business relationship between auditor and client. This research indicates
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that if a case between a banker and an auditor is brought to trial in eastern New 
Mexico, the jury would most likely perceive the situation from the auditor’s 
perspective. The inclusion o f bankers in this study helps to put the juror-auditor 
expectation-performance gap into perspective.
All three o f the subject groups identified co-contracting between auditor and 
client (B5) and auditor advocacy (B l) as statistically significant contrasts from the 
normal audit. In other words, the mean financial liability related to behavioral scenarios 
B 1 and B5 were found to be significantly larger than that associated with the normal 
audit. Co-contracting is prohibited by the SEC for auditors o f publicly traded 
companies. It appears that this also is considered a violation of prudent business 
behavior in the private company setting. Auditor advocacy is a more difficult 
behavioral concept to discern. There is a fine line between providing professional 
counsel and assisting the client in pushing the limits o f GAAP. The appearance of 
independence is impaired by these two types o f behaviors.
Litigation is normally initiated by financial statement users who perceive that 
the auditor failed to provide adequate financial information. From this perspective it is 
important to  examine the remaining contrast that is statistically significant from the 
bankers’ perspective. The bankers identified management fraud as the only other 
statistically significant contrast from the normal audit.
Auditor responsibility for the detection and reporting of fraud has been a 
contentious issue for over 30 years. Congress, regulators, the judiciary system and the 
general public attribute a “public watchdog” role to the independent auditor. The
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distinction between fraud auditing and the audit o f financial statements seems to be lost 
on all but those directly involved in the profession. The profession has attempted to 
bridge this component o f the expectation-performance gap with public education, a 
major rephrasing o f the audit report emphasizing the limitations o f a financial 
statement audit, and the promulgation o f  professional standards that attempt to 
elucidate professional responsibilities o f the independent auditor. Historically these 
attempts have met with limited success. After years o f deliberation, the AICPA (1997) 
recently issued S AS #82, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. “This 
new standard clearly articulates the independent auditor’s responsibility, that is, to plan 
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud” 
(AICPA, 1997).
The intrinsic weakness o f independent auditing is the auditor’s dependence on 
client management. Management normally is involved in the hiring, supervision, and 
payment o f the auditor. All o f the financial information examined by the auditor is 
under the direct control o f management. The detection of management fraud can be a 
very difficult task. It is entirely possible for management to perpetrate a fraud for a 
considerable length o f time without detection. This leaves the auditor in a tenuous 
legal position.
It appears that the bankers expect more from auditors in this regard than is 
possible to achieve. Resolution of this aspect o f the expectation-performance gap has 
eluded professional standards setters and regulators. It is reassuring that the jurors
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failed to perceive management fraud as a statistically significant contrast with the 
normal audit.
The final three contrasts to the normal audit that were considered statistically 
different by the jurors are worth examining (cross-hiring o f audit personnel (B4), 
management advisory services (B2), and audit fees (B3)). Although the bankers did 
not perceive any of them to be statistically significant, these behavioral scenarios are 
important if they become the subject o f litigation. To the extent that financial statement 
users perceive that jurors attribute financial responsibly to auditors for these behaviors, 
participation in such auditor-auditee relationships pose a continuing financial liability to 
auditors.
It is interesting to note that auditor financial liability contrasts associated with 
audit fees (B3) and management fraud (B6) are statistically significant for the CPAs at 
the a  = 0.10 level. Although this is not a strong inference it does indicate a degree of 
sensitivity to these issues by the profession. Rather than assessing these behavioral 
scenarios as containing higher levels o f financial culpability, this result may indicate that 
CPAs perceive that financial statement users hold them to this higher standard.
The results of the multiple regression analysis indicate that the jurors affect the 
mean response o f the model in a similar fashion as the CPAs for all the behavioral 
scenarios except for the audit fees scenario (B3) in which the jurors attribute greater 
perceived auditor financial liability. This was not an expected result in light o f the 
research o f Lowe (1994), and Anderson, Lowe and Reckers (1993) where the 
perceptions of jurors or judges were significantly different from that o f CPAs. This
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discrepancy in results may be attributed to  the fact that the above authors considered 
only one behavioral scenario, rather than the six behavioral scenarios considered in this 
study.
Research in independence does not explain perceptual differences in the normal 
audit situation (NA). The results o f this study indicate that Caucasian subjects attribute 
less financial liability to the auditor than other ethnic groups.
Although prior research has not addressed auditor advocacy (B l), it is 
interesting to  note that subjects with less than a college education attribute more 
financial liability than those with a college degree. In other words, a completed degree 
(at least 4 years) in higher education plays a mitigating role in perceived financial 
liability in this particular behavioral scenario.
The perceived auditor financial liability associated with the audit fees (B3) 
appears to be influenced by a number o f variables. Both jurors and bankers perceive 
this compromise o f auditor independence to be a threat to the financial reporting 
system. They hold auditors to a greater degree o f financial culpability than do CPAs 
when the auditor-auditee relationship reflects this behavioral characteristic. This is 
consistent with the results of Bartlett’s (1993) study where the relative size o f the audit 
fee was perceived by bankers to have greater influence on perceived auditor 
independence than the CPAs.
The subjects’ prior knowledge o f accounting and auditing as reflected in the 
number o f courses completed provides an interesting result in conjunction with two 
scenarios. The influence is statistically significant at the a = 0.0636 level for the audit
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fees (B3) behavioral scenario and at the a  -  0.1042 for the management advisory 
services (B2) behavioral scenario. The positive sign o f the coefficient is cause o f 
reflection. Research by Bartlett (1993), Pany and Reckers (1984) and Pany and 
Reckers (1983) indicated that the knowledge of accounting had little influence on the 
perception o f auditor independence, whereas Burton (1980) and Mednick (1990) found 
that the more knowledgeable a respondent is about accounting and auditing the more 
likely they are to perceive the auditor to be independent. Therefore, it seems that the 
findings in the context o f behavioral scenarios B2 and B3 are not in alignment with 
prior research. It appears that in this study, subjects with more knowledge in 
accounting and auditing tend to attribute more financial liability for these two 
scenarios.
Contribution to the Literature 
There is much research in the literature on auditor independence where the 
perceptions o f financial statement users are compared with that o f financial statement 
preparers. Typically, certified public accountants have been used as surrogates for 
financial statement preparers and bankers or investment analysts have been used as 
proxies for financial statement users. In general, financial statement users perceive 
independence to be impaired when the auditor-client relationship involves the behaviors 
that were examined in this study.
Recent research on hindsight bias has utilized members o f the judiciary system 
as subjects. These are the first studies to examine the opinions o f individuals not
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directly involved in the financial reporting system. This hindsight bias research has 
compared the perceptions of judges or jurors with that o f CPAs with respect to auditor 
responsibility. As expected, judiciary subjects tend to hold auditors to  a higher 
standard than has the public accounting profession.
One o f the unique characteristics o f the current study is the inclusion o f all three 
groups as subjects: jurors, bank: loan officers, and CPAs. The jurors represent the 
ultimate decision makers in the litigation struggle between financial statement user- 
plaintiffs and financial statement preparer-defendants. Bank loan officers represent 
financial statement users. Although CPAs are not actually responsible for the 
preparation o f the financial statements, but rather provide an independent auditor’s 
opinion, prior research has used CPAs as a surrogate for financial statement preparers. 
This current study follows this precedent.
Another innovation of this study is the focus on auditor financial culpability. 
Previous studies assessed the perception o f their subjects regarding auditor 
independence. The current study measured the subjects’ perception o f the financial 
responsibility o f the auditor under six important auditor-auditee relationships. A survey 
instrument was used to obtain the subjects’ perceptions of auditor culpability in 
behavioral scenarios identified in the independence literature. The linking o f the level 
of auditor culpability to specific behavioral circumstances is expected to clarify the 
issues o f the expectation-performance gap that can and should be addressed.
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Recommendations for Future Research 
A major limitation o f this study is that the samples were drawn from a limited 
geographic region. The participants are residents o f eastern New Mexico, which is a 
rural region with an agriculturally based economy. The moral, philosophical, and 
political characteristics o f these subjects may not represent the predisposition o f jurors 
located in an urban region with a stronger industrial and service economy. Additional 
samples need to be drawn from diverse geographic regions to obtain a more 
representative sample o f the entire population. The broader the sample coverage, the 
more generalizable would be the results.
Administering the survey instrument to an impaneled jury has its limitations as 
well. As indicated earlier, juror responses as to  anticipated decisions may not reflect 
true decisions under more realistic conditions. If  one were able to obtain permission to 
administer the survey instrument subsequent to a jury trial, where a financial statement 
user-plaintiff and an auditor-defendant were the litigants, the responses would have 
been more authentic.
Bankers are not necessarily representative o f all financial statement users. 
Financial analysts and sophisticated investors (for example institutional investors) are 
important financial statement users who may perceive the role of the auditor in a 
different light. By extending the study to include these financial statement users, the 
generalizability o f the results would be enhanced.
Although CPAs have been the target o f malpractice law suits as a result o f 
client financial statements, the actual preparers o f financial statements are client
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management. The independent auditor’s opinion contains a statement that “The 
financial statements are the responsibility o f the Company’s management” (AICPA, 
1995, v. 1). Appropriate subjects for this study would be chief financial officers or 
controllers o f organizations who prepare financial statements that are audited by CPAs. 
These subjects could be obtained from the membership roster o f the Institute of 
Management Accounts.
Managerial Implications 
Auditors are an important component o f the public accounting profession.
They provide a service that contributes to the success o f the financial reporting system 
in this country. Auditors are in a unique position of working for financial statement 
preparers while the professional product, the independent auditor’s opinion, is issued 
for the benefit of financial statement users. The subjectivity o f the financial preparation 
process, combined with potential extended business relationships between auditors and 
clients, can place auditors in a compromising position. Third parties may perceive the 
auditor as representing the interests of the client at the expense of the financial 
statement users.
Over the years, auditors have found it increasingly difficult to balance the 
interests of financial statement users with the expansion o f business consulting services 
to audit clients. In performing the role of independent auditor, they are expected to 
exercise an appropriate degree o f professional scepticism. This type of relationship 
implies that the auditor attempts to objectively evaluate management decisions with
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respect to the recording and reporting of financial information. As an independent, 
objective professional, the auditor’s role is to report to third parties on the success or 
failure o f client management.
The role of a successful business consultant is to provide management with 
tools and resources that enhance the performance o f the enterprise. This is the role of 
an advocate. Public accounting firms have experienced substantial revenue growth as 
a result o f expanding management advisory services. The problem is that even when 
these roles are performed by different professionals, the overall success o f the public 
accounting firm is dependent on the success of these combined and possibly 
incompatible services.
From a practice management perspective, auditors must find an effective 
organizational structure for the delivery of audit services that sustains the integrity of 
the independent audit report. The results o f this study indicate that co-contracting 
between auditor and client (B5) and auditor advocacy (B l) seriously jeopardize the 
appearance o f auditor independence. Many of the other behavioral scenarios were also 
found by one or more of the subject groups to increase the auditor’s financial liability. 
Partners and managers must consider these results and structure future client 
relationships in a fashion that limits the firm’s financial liability. One approach for 
achieving this objective may entail the restructuring o f the organization in such a way 
as to separate the audit function from other public accounting services that jeopardize 
the appearance of independence.
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As a matter o f fact, Arthur Andersen is one o f the first international firms to 
attempt this type of restructuring for the express purpose o f separating the business 
consulting activities from the more traditional public accounting services. Arthur 
Andersen & Company continues to offer traditional public accounting services. 
Andersen Consulting is a management consulting firm that competes in international 
markets with the other prestigious management consulting firms (Lowe and Pany, 
1994). This form o f organizational separation may be the harbinger for international 
public accounting firms.
Public accounting historically has been a self-regulated profession. Professional 
standards setting associations set standards that guide professionals and ensure the 
integrity o f the financial reporting system. A broad cross-section o f representatives of 
financial statement preparers and financial statement users participate in the regulatory 
process. Over the years several suggestions have been advanced for restructuring the 
public accounting profession. The most radical o f these proposals entails the total 
restriction on auditing firms from providing management advisory services to audit 
clients (Hillison and Kennelley, 1988). The commingling of audit services with MAS 
appears to diminish the value o f the independent auditor’s report and expose public 
accountants to unreasonable legal liability. The separation of these services with 
respect to an individual client may be the only alternative available to professional 
standards setters. The results o f this study support the conclusion that the auditor- 
auditee relationships examined here compromise the appearance o f auditor 
independence and expose the auditing firm to increased financial exposure.
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If  the public accounting profession is unable or unwilling to address this issue, 
regulators may be forced to impose a solution. Traditionally, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has delegated the regulation o f public accounting to 
professional standards setting organizations. There is reason to believe that the 
profession has been less than effective in imposing regulations that preserve the 
integrity o f the financial reporting system. The results o f this study suggest that some 
regulatory intervention may be justifiable.
In addition to the impact on professional standards setting, this study provides 
information that might be useful in litigation. The multiple regression models produced 
some statistically significant variables that would be useful in the jury selection process. 
Table 18 contains a  summary o f those variables in which parameter estimates were 
statistically significant. The sign indicates which party to a law suit would benefit in 
selecting this attribute in a potential juror. Specifically, a variable associated with a 
positive parameter sign would be preferred by the plaintiff, whereas, a variable 
associated with a negative parameter sign would be preferred by the defendant. The 
attributes that provide advantage for the plaintiff and the defendant are listed in their 
respective columns.
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Table 18
Summary o f Recommendations for Jury Selection
Significant
Variable
Attribute Preferred By
oCCIUtl to raTaiiiClti
Estimate Plaintiff |  Defendant |
NA Bankers
Caucasian
15.0402
-9.7804
Bankers
Non-Caucasian
Non-bankers
Caucasian
B1 Bankers 
No degree
24.2603
13.2740
Bankers 
No degree
Non-bankers 
College degree
B2 Bankers 25.5750 Bankers Non-bankers
B3 Jurors 
Bankers 
A&A courses
25.2311
26.3868
0.8125
Jurors 
Bankers 
A&A courses
Non-jurors 
Non-bankers 
No A&A courses
B4 Bankers 24.9417 Bankers Non-bankers
BS Bankers 20.1762 Bankers Non-bankers
B6 Bankers 19.2963 Bankers Non-bankers
Note that in all o f the behavioral scenarios the selection o f a banker as a juror 
would be advantageous to the plaintiff. The defense attorney would work to eliminate 
this occupational group from the jury panel.
In a case where the circumstances are similar to the normal audit (NA) scenario, 
the plaintiff attorney would select jurors from minority ethnic groups. These jurors are 
more likely to favor the plaintiffs position. Likewise, the defendant would be better 
served by Caucasian jurors who appear to be more sympathetic to the auditor.
The selection of jurors with at least a college degree would work to the 
advantage of the auditor-defendant in a case that had a similar fact pattern to that of
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behavioral scenario B1 (auditor advocacy). Likewise, the plaintiff would prefer a juror 
with less than a college degree (No degree).
With respect to behavioral scenario B3 (audit fees), three juror characteristics 
are significant in the selection process. In this study, the occupations o f the jurors 
included a cross-section of military personnel, professionals, clerical employees, 
farmers, self-employed retailers, home makers and retired persons. In exam ining the 
impact o f the jurors variable, the only occupational category that would be 
advantageous to the auditor-defendant would be a CPA, if available.
Also, with respect to behavioral scenario B3 (audit fees), jurors who have 
completed more accounting and/or auditing courses (A&A courses) would render a 
decision that would favor the plaintiff. In this behavioral setting, the auditor-defendant 
would be best served by jurors with little or no knowledge of accounting and/or 
auditing (No A&A courses).
It appears from the above discussion that the bankers variable is a common 
denominator in all o f the scenarios, and should always be preferred by the plaintiff and 
avoided by the defendant. It is possible that this variable might be extended to include 
other types o f financial statement users, such as financial analysts or institutional 
shareholders. Further research would need to be conducted to support this assertion.
The final managerial implication involves insight derived from this study with 
respect to the expectation-performance gap. Historically the expectation-performance 
gap has been defined in terms o f the differences in perception between accountants and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the general public (Porter, 1993). There was no distinction between financial statement 
users and other parties.
The findings o f this suggest that there continues to be an expectation- 
performance gap, but the perceptual differences are between bankers and all other 
subject groups. With the exception of behavioral scenario B3 (audit fees) in which the 
perceptions of bankers and jurors were similar and significantly different from CPAs, 
there were statistically significant differences between the responses of bankers and that 
o f jurors and CPAs.
In allocating resources toward reducing the expectation-performance gap, the 
public accounting profession should target bankers and possibly other financial 
statement users, such as financial analysts and shareholders. This appears to be where 
the true perceptual differences exist.
i
i
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Survey Instrument: Jurors, Pages I and 4
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Eastern New Mexico University 
College o f Business, Station #49 
Portales, NM 88130 
(505)562-2366
Dear Juror Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey form. This is part of a study of the 
professional responsibility of independent auditors for the accuracy of published financial statements. 
Your perceptions will be very helpful in our examination of this issue.
The survey consists of a brief hypothetical case where subsequent to the issuance o f the annual audited 
financial statements the company becomes insolvent You will be given seven separate audit 
environments that may affect your decision. In each situation you are asked to indicate the degree of 
financial responsibility that should be assessed against the independent auditors.
Hypothetical Case: Superior Cedar Products, Inc. sold cedar building products to wholesale 
markets in the United States, Japan, and the Pacific Rim countries. The company was 
considered an industry leader providing quality products for almost 50 years.
In early 1992, the independent auditors, Paulson and Associates began the audit o f the 1991 
annual financial statements. The objective o f an audit is to provide an independent and objective 
assessment of the financial statements as prepared by management. Creditors and investors 
depend on the integrity of this process to make financial decisions.
The financial statements were published in March, 1992. The auditors’ opinion indicated that 
the financial statements were fairly stated in all material respects. Six months later the company 
filed for protection under federal bankruptcy law. The following May the company was 
liquidated. Three major creditors representing unpaid claims in excess of $5 million filed suit 
against Superior Cedar Products, Inc. and Paulson and Associates.
For each o f the separate audit circumstances please indicate the percentage (if any) o f the financial loss 
that should be attributed to the independent auditors. Please be sure to complete the demographic 
questions on the back page.
Thank you for your assistance.
1
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Please complete the following demographic information:
Occupation:______________________________________________
Number of year experience in this occupation:_____________________
Gender
Male 
Female
Annual Household Income:
Under $20,000 _____
$20,000 - $34,999 _____
$35,000 - $49,999 _____
$50,000 - $64,999 _____
$65,000 - $79,999 _____
$80,000 and over _____
Education:
Not completed high school 
Completed high school 
Completed two years of college 
Completed college (4 years)
Completed some graduate course work
Number of years since completion of education
Prior Knowledge of Accounting and Auditing:
Please indicate the number of accounting 
courses you have completed.
4
Marital Status:
Never married 
Currently married 
Currently single
Ethnicity:
African-American
Asian-American
Caucasian-American
Hispanic-American
Native American
Foreign bom
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Eastern New Mexico University 
College o f Business, Station #49 
Portales, NM 88130 
(505)562-2366
Dear Banker: Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey form. This is part of a study of 
the professional responsibility of independent auditors for the accuracy of published financial 
statements. Your perceptions will be very helpful in our examination of this issue.
The survey consists of a brief hypothetical case where subsequent to the issuance of the annual audited 
financial statements the company becomes insolvent You will be given seven separate audit 
environments that may affect your decision. In each situation you are asked to indicate the degree of 
financial responsibility that should be assessed against the independent auditors.
Hypothetical Case: Superior Cedar Products, Inc. sold cedar building products to wholesale 
markets in the United States, Japan, and the Pacific Rim countries. The company was considered 
an industry leader providing quality products for almost 50 years.
In early 1992, the independent auditors, Paulson and Associates began the audit of the 1991 
annual financial statements. The objective of an audit is to provide an independent and objective 
assessment of the financial statements as prepared by management Creditors and investors 
depend on the integrity of this process to make financial decisions.
The financial statements were published in March, 1992. The auditors’ opinion indicated that 
the financial statements were fairly stated in all material respects. Six months later the company 
filed for protection under federal bankruptcy law. The following May the company was 
liquidated. Three major creditors representing unpaid claims in excess of $5 million filed suit 
against Superior Cedar Products, Inc. and Paulson and Associates.
For each o f the separate audit circumstances please indicate the percentage (if any) of the financial loss 
that should be attributed to the independent auditors. Please be sure to complete the demographic 
questions on page 4.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sid Glandon 
Instructor of Accounting
i
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Please complete the following demographic information:
Occupation:_______________________________
Yean experience in this occupation:_____________
Gender
Male 
Female
Annual Household Income:
Under $20,000 _____
$20,000 - $34,999 _____
$35,000 - $49,999 _____
$50,000 - $64,999 _____
$65,000 - $79,999 _____
$80,000 and over _____
Education:
Did not complete high school 
Completed high school 
Completed two years of college 
Completed college (4 years)
Completed some graduate course work
Number of years since completion of education
P rio r Knowledge of Accounting and Auditing:
Please indicate the number of accounting 
courses you have completed.
Marital Status:
Never married 
Currently married 
Currently single
Ethnicity:
African-American
Asian-American
Caucasian-American
Hispanic-American
Native American
Foreign bom
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Eastern New Mexico University 
College of Business, Station #49 
Portales, NM 88130 
(505)562-2366
Dear {CPA}: Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey form. This is part of a  study of 
the professional responsibility of independent auditors for the accuracy of published financial 
statements. Your perceptions will be very helpful in our examination of this issue.
The survey consists of a  brief hypothetical case where subsequent to the issuance o f the annual audited 
financial statements the company becomes insolvent You will be given seven separate audit 
environments that may affect your decision. In each situation you are asked to indicate the degree of 
financial responsibility that should be assessed against the independent auditors.
Hypothetical Case: Superior Cedar Products, Inc. sold cedar building products to wholesale 
markets in the United States, Japan, and the Pacific Rim countries. The company was considered 
an industry leader providing quality products for almost 50 years.
In early 1992, the independent auditors, Paulson and Associates began the audit o f the 1991 annual 
financial statements. The objective of an audit is to provide an independent and objective 
assessment of the financial statements as prepared by management Creditors and investors depend 
on the integrity of this process to make financial decisions.
The financial statements were published in March, 1992. The auditors’ opinion indicated that the 
financial statements were fairly stated in all material respects. Six months later the company filed 
for protection under federal bankruptcy law. The following May the company was liquidated.
Three major creditors representing unpaid claims in excess of $5 million filed suit against Superior 
Cedar Products, Inc. and Paulson and Associates.
For each of the separate audit circumstances please indicate the percentage (if any) o f the financial loss 
that should be attributed to the independent auditors. Please be sure to complete the demographic 
questions on page 4.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sid Glandon 
Instructor of Accounting
t
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Please complete the following demographic information:
Occupation:_________________________________ _
Y ean experience in this occupation:_______________
Gender
Male 
Female
Annual Household Income:
Under $20,000 ____
$20,000 - $34,999 ____
$35,000 - $49,999 ____
$50,000 - $64,999 _____
$65,000 - $79,999 ____
$80,000 and over ____
Education:
Did not complete high school 
Completed high school 
Completed two years of college 
Completed college (4 years)
Completed some graduate course work
Number o f years since completion of education
P rior Knowledge of Accounting and Auditing: 
Please indicate the number of accounting 
courses you have completed.
Marital Status:
Never married 
Currently married 
Currently single
Ethnicity:
African-American
Asian-American
Caucasian-American
Hispanic-American
Native American
Foreign bom
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Instructions: The following is a list of seven typical audit circumstances that may jeopardize the degree of 
independence of auditors. Each circumstance should he treated at a separate instance. The scale to the right reflects 
the percentage of the S3 million financial loss that you would attribute to the independent auditors. Please place an "X" 
on the scale and write the percentage chosen above your selection. See the example |o Use right.
EXAMPLE: For a choice of 22%
22%
1 X 1 1
OH 3QK IOOH
Normal Audit; The only work that the independent auditors did for the company was an audit at the end of each year. 
In this audit circumstance what percentage of the liability (if any) would you attribute to the independent auditors? I . 1 |
OH SOH IOOH
Auditor Advocacy: In the early 1990s the company experienced a decline in camings. After reviewing the situation 
Paulson and Associates recommended a change in accounting policy that would effectively delay the recognition of 
certain costs. The company adopted this alternative accounting policy, which increased net income by 20%. In this 
audit circumstance what percentage of the liability (if any) would you attribute to the independent auditors? 1.. .  1 1 
OH SOH tOOH
Management Advisory Services; In 1991, Paulson and Associates, assisted the company with Use redesign of the 
company’s information system and supervised the selection and installation of a computer system. The fees associated 
with this additional engagement were twice the amount of the normal audit fee. In this audit circumstance what 
percentage of the liability (if any) would you attribute to the independent auditors? L. 1 1
OH SOH IOOH
Audit Fees: The audit fees for this diem represent 40% of the total fees billed by the local office of Paulson and 
Associates. In this audit dicumstance what percentage of the liability (if any) would you attribute to the independent 
auditors?
1 1 1 OH SOH IOOH
Cross-lliring of Accounting Personnel; The controller of the company had been an audit manager of Paulson and 
Associates for approximately 10 years. Prior to taking the position with Superior Cedar Products, Inc., he had been 
responsible for the annual audit of the company. In this audit circumstance what percentage of the liability (if any) 
would you attribute to the independent auditors?
1 1 1 
OK SOH IOOH
Co-Contracting Between Auditor and Client: The company has expertise in manufacturing and marketing that has 
resulted in opportunities for turn-key operations in several Pacific Rim countries. The company co-contracted these 
ventures with Paulson and Associates; the CPA firm provides the administrative and information systems expertise. In 
this audit circumstance what percentage of the liability (if any) would you attribute to the independent auditors?
•
L _ . . . . . . . . . .  1 . 1
OH SOH IOOH
Management Fraud; The officers of the company fraudulently misrepresented the amount of merchandise inventory 
during the audit of the 1991 and 1992 financial statements. This caused the financial statements to be overstated by 
3300,000 and $700,000 for the two years respectively. In this audit circumstance what percentage of the liability (if any) 
would you attribute to the independent auditors?
1 1 1 
OH SOH IOOH
FomQO
2 )
Cover Letter to Bankers
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February 28, 1997
{Banker Name}
{Address}
{Address}
{Address}
Dear {Banker Name}:
Enclosed is a survey form that is being used in a research project at Eastern New 
Mexico University. The purpose o f the research is to measure the perception of 
prospective jurors, CPAs, and bankers as to the professional liability of Certified Public 
Accountants in the performance o f a financial statement audit.
You have been selected to participate in this study as a representative o f the banking 
profession. The participant in this study does not have to have actually served on a jury. 
Please take a few minutes to answer the questions in the survey. Once you have 
completed the survey, please place in the self-addressed, stamped envelope and mail to 
my office. Your confidential responses will provide valuable information that may 
prove useful for both standards setters and auditors.
As an expression o f my appreciation for your time, enclosed is a dollar bill. This is to 
provide you with a cup o f coffee once you have completed the survey form. If you are 
interested in receiving a copy of the results o f this study, please complete the enclosed 
post card. Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours,
Sid Glandon, MBA, CPA 
Instructor o f Accounting
Enc.
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March 3, 1997
{CPA Name}
{Address}
{Address}
{Address}
Dear {CPA Name}:
Enclosed is a survey form that is being used in a research project at Eastern New 
Mexico University. The purpose o f the research is to measure the perception o f 
prospective jurors, CPAs, and bankers as to the professional liability of Certified Public 
Accountants in the performance o f a financial statement audit.
You have been selected to participate in this study as a representative of the 
professional public accounting profession. The participant in this study does not have 
to have actually served on a jury. Please take a few minutes to answer the questions in 
the survey. Once you have completed the survey, please place in the self-addressed, 
stamped envelope and mail to my office. Your confidential responses will provide 
valuable information that may prove useful for both standards setters and auditors.
As an expression of my appreciation for you time, enclosed is a dollar bill. This is to 
provide you with a cup o f coffee once you have completed the survey form. If you are 
interested in receiving a copy o f the results of this study, please complete the enclosed 
postcard. Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours,
Sid Glandon, MBA, CPA 
Instructor o f Accounting
Enc.
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Table A1
Format of Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables___________________
CPAs T o ta lInformation Jurors Bankers
Gender
male
female
married
not married
Annual Household 
Income:
less than $65,000
$65,000 or more
Caucasian-American
other
Education:
did not complete 
college
completed college
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Table A2
Format of Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables
1 Information 1 Jurors 1 Bankers I CPAs 0 Total I
Years worked:
range
average
Years since completion 
of education:
range
average
Number of accounting or 
auditing courses:
range
average
I
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STATISTICAL CALCULATIONS
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Table B1
Tukey Test for Additivity: Jurors
126
Tukey Test for Additivity 
Subjects: Jurors
Source df SS MS
Question
Juror
Error
6
66
3%
34892.8614
157167.2239
171302.5672
Total 468 363362.6525
5815.4769
2381.3216
432.5822
SUM OF PRODUCTS
SSA/b
SSB/a
330700.5100
520.7890
22452.4606
SSAB*
SSRem*
9352.8508
161949.7164
F*
F[0.95; 1,395]
22.8119
3.84
Note. F - = ™ * L  +
I (7X469)-7-469
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Table B2
Tukey Test for Additivity: Bankers
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Tukey Test for Additivity 
Subjects: Bankers
Source d f SS MS
Question 6 29925.2782
Juror 56 142803.1779
Error 336 194856.4361
Total 398 367584.8922
4987.5664
2550.0567
579.9299
SSAB*
SSRem*
F* —
F[0.95; 1,335]
192.4121
194664.0240
0.3311
3.84
Note: F" = + SSRem'
(7X399)-7 -399
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Tukey Test for Additivity: CPAs
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Tukey Test for Additivity 
Subjects: CPAs
Source d f SS MS
Question 6 12066.2603 2011.0434
Juror 44 175819.6064 3995.9001
Error 264 120276.8825 455.5943
Total 314 308162.7492
SSAB* 289.5000
SSRem* 119987.3825
F* 0.6346
F[0.95; 1,2631 3.84
Note-. F ' — SSRL"-‘ ■
I (7X3I5)-7-315
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Table B4
Tukey Test for Additivity: Jurors LNfl-f-YJ
Tukey Test for Additivity 
Subjects: LN (1+Yij)
Source_______________________________ df__________ SS________ MS
Question (a=7) 6 103.7472 17.2912
Juror (b=67) 66 649.1569 9.8357
Error 396 544.4240 1.3748
Total 468 1297.3281
SSAB* 4.3579
SSRem* 540.0661
F* 3.1873
F[0.95; 1,395] 3.84
No* F’ = jg jg l 4. _  SSRem"_ _
1 (7X469)-7 -469
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Table BS
Hartley Test for Equality of Variances: Jurors LN(1+Yj)
Hartley Test for Equal Variance 
Subjects: Jurors Lnfl+YJ
Test Statistic:
H = Max(S,i)/Min(SIi)
H = 4.36/1.33 3.2782
Tabulated H:
H(0.99;21,66) 3.2
n = 67
Differences Variance
NA-B1
NA-B2
NA-B3
NA-B4
NA-B5
NA-B6
B1-B2
B1-B3
B1-B4
B1-B5
B1-B6
B2-B3
B2-B4
B2-B5
B2-B6
B3-B4
B3-B5
B3-B6
B4-BS
B4-B6
B5-B6
2.72
2.71
2.08
2.70
2.19 
4.21 
1.90 
2.60
2.20 
2.08 
3.96 
2.75 
3.05 
2.57 
4.36 
2.49 
1.67 
3.42 
1.33 
3.18 
3.56
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Table B6
Hartley Test for Equality of Variances: Bankers
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Hartley Test for Equal Variance 
Subjects: Bankers
Test Statistic:
H = Max(S1j)/Min(S*i)
H = 1581.79/660.85 2.3936
Tabulated H:
H(0.99;21,56) 3.5
n = 57
Differences Variance
N A -B i 
N A-B2 
NA-B3 
NA-B4 
NA-B5 
NA-B6 
B1-B2 
B1 -B3 
B1-B4 
B1-B5 
B1 -B6 
B2-B3 
B2-B4 
B2-B5 
B2-B6 
B3 -B4 
B3-B5 
B3-B6 
B4-B5 
B4-B6 
B5-B6
1336.33
1144.16
1197.15
1407.76
884.44
1279.05
872.74
873.64
1316.36
1115.28
1581.79
660.85
1173.40
1204.04
1302.00 
991.08
1052.96
1557.00 
1121.73 
1386.92
896.38
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Table B7
Hartley Test for Equality of Variances: CPAs
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Hartley Test for Equal Variance 
Subjects: CPAs
Test Statistic:
H = MaxfS^/MinlS^
H = 1599.03/456.91 3.4997
Tabulated H:
H(0.99;21,44) 4.2
n = 45
Differences Variance
NA-BI
NA-B2
NA-B3
NA-B4
NA-B5
NA-B6
B1-B2
BI-B3
B1-B4
B1-B5
B1-B6
B2-B3
B2-B4
B2-B5
B2-B6
B3-B4
B3-B5
B3-B6
B4-B5
B4-B6
B5-B6
519.16
720.89
456.91 
483.80
1251.39
647.69
973.86
580.71
805.75 
881.73
993.75
996.91 
841.65
1195.48
987.95
804.53
1599.03
863.21
1318.11
744.59
1467.87
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Table B8
Bonferroni Test of Contrasts for Jurors
MSE = 1 .3748 n = 67 Itu g = 6
1
A lpha = O .O l
t - v a l u e  =  3.2103
Minimum S i g n i f i c a n t  D ifference(M S D ): 0 .6504
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n tra s t MSD S ig f
B5 3 .1211 1 .6749 1.4461 0.6504
B1 2.7805 1 .6749 1.1055 0.6504 ♦
B4 2 .7455 1.6749 1.0705 0.6504
B2 2 .7168 1.6749 1.0419 0.6504
B3 2 .4659 1.6749 0.7910 0.6504
B6 1.9567 1 .6749 0.2818 0.6504
A lpha ** 0 .0 5
t - v a lu e  = 2 .6530
Minimum S i g n i f i c a n t  D ifference(M S D ): 0 .5374
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n tra s t MSD S ig f
B5 3 .1211 1.6749 1.4461 0.5374
B1 2 .7805 1.6749 1.1055 0.5374
B4 2 .7455 1.6749 1.0705 0.5374
B2 2.7168 1.6749 1.0419 0.5374
B3 2 .4659 1.6749 0.7910 0.5374
B6 1.9567 1.6749 0.2818 0.5374
Alpha = 0 .1 0
t - v a l u e  = 2.3967
Minimum S i g n i f i c a n t  D if fe re n c e : 0 .4855
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n tra s t MSD S ig f
B5 3 .1211 1.6749 1.4461 0.4855
B1 2.7805 1.674 9 1.1055 0.4855
B4 2 .7455 1.6749 1.0705 0.4855
B2 2.7168 1.6749 1.0419 0.4855
B3 2 .4659 1.6749 0.7910 0.4855 ****
B6 1.9567 1.6749 0.2818 0.4855
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Table B9
Bonferroni Test of Contrasts for Bankers
MSE = 579.9299 n = 57 r  = 7 g = 7r
A lpha = 0 .0 1
t - v a l u e  = 3.2103
Minimum S ig n i f i c a n t  D ifference(M S D ): = 14 .4816
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n tra s t MSD S ig f
B5 52.7719 28.1053 24.6667 14.4816
B1 46.6140 28.1053 18.5088 14.4816
B6 44.1579 28.1053 16.0526 14.4816
B4 37.7895 28.1053 9.6842 14.4816
B2 32.4561 28.1053 4.3509 14.4816
B3 29.6140 28.1053 1.5088 14.4816
A lpha = 0 .0 5
t - v a l u e  =
Minimum S ig n i f i c a n t  D ifference(M S D ): 11 .9675
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n tra s t MSD S ig f
B5 52.7719 28.1053 24.6667 11.9675
B1 46.6140 28.1053 18.5088 11.9675
B6 44.1579 28.1053 16.0526 11.9675
B4 37.7895 28.1053 9.6842 11.9675
B2 32.4561 28.1053 4.3509 11.9675
B3 29.6140 28.1053 1.5088 11.9675
A lpha = 0 . 1 0
t - v a l u e  =
Minimum S ig n i f i c a n t  D if fe re n c e  (MSD): 10 .8112
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n tra s t MSD S ig f
B5 52.7719 28.1053 24.6667 10.8112
B1 46.6140 28.1053 18.5088 10.8112 ♦  ♦ + ♦
B6 44.1579 28.1053 16.0526 10.8112
B4 37.7895 28.1053 9.6842 10.8112
B2 32.4561 28.1053 4 .3509 10.8112
B3 29.6140 28.1053 1.5088 10.8112
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Table BIO
Bonferroni Test of Contrasts for CPAs
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MSE = 455.5943 n = 45 II -J o II o>
1 .
A loha = 0 .0 1
t - v a l u e  = 3 .2 1 0 3
Minimum S i g n i f i c a n t  D ifference(M SD ) : 14.4460
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n t ra s t MSD S iQ f
B5 3 8 .0000 17.8667 20 .1 3 3 3 14.4460
B1 3 5 .6667 17.8667 17 .8000 14.4460
B3 29 .5333 17.8667 11.6667 14.4460
B6 29.2444 17.8667 11 .3778 14.4460
B4 26 .4000 17.8667 8 .5 3 3 3 14.4460
B2 25.5778 17.8667 7 .7 1 1 1 14.4460
A lpha = 0 . 0 5
t - v a l u e  = 2 .6 5 3 0
Minimum S i q n i f i c a n t  D ifference(M SD ) : 11.9381
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n t ra s t MSD s i a f
B5 38 .0000 17.8667 2 0 .1 3 3 3 11.9381
B1 35.6667 17.8667 17 .8000 11.9381
B3 29 .5333 17.8667 1 1 .6667 11.9381
B6 29.2444 17.8667 11 .3778 11.9381
B4 26 .4000 17.8667 8 .5 3 3 3 11.9381
B2 25 .5778 17.8667 7 .7 1 1 1 11.9381
A loha = 0 .1 0
t - v a l u e  = 2 .3967
Minimum S i q n i f i c a n t  D ifference(M S D ): 10 .7846
S c e n a r io Mean NA Mean C o n t r a s t MSD S iq f
B5 38 .0000 17.8667 20 .1 3 3 3 10.7846
B1 35.6667 17.8667 17 .8000 10.7846
B3 29 .5333 17.8667 11 .6667 10.7846
B6 29.2444 17.8667 11 .3778 10.7846
B4 26 .4000 17.8667 8 .5 3 3 3 10.7846
B2 2 5 .5778 17.8667 7 .7 1 1 1 10.7846
i
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Table B ll 
Friedman Rank Test
Group NA
Mean Response to Questions 
B l B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
Jurors 1.67 2.78 2.72 2.47 2.75 3.12 1.96
Bankers 28.11 46.61 32.46 29.61 37.79 52.77 44.16
CPAs 17.87 35.67 25.58 29.53 26.40 38.00 29.24
Rank of Means*
Group NA B l B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
Jurors I 6 4 3 5 7 2
Bankers I 6 3 2 4 7 5
CPAs 1 6 2 5 3 7 4
3.00 18.00 9.00 10.00 12.00 21.00 11.00
Rbarj 1.00 6.00 3.00 3.33 4.00 7.00 3.67
IR 2, 9.00 324.00 81.00 100.00 144.00 441.00 121.00
E R / = 1220 
T = 15.1239
Tabulated x2 = X2F>-95,6] = 12.59
Since T = 15.1239 > 12.59, conclude that there is agreement between group rankings.
♦Note that the ranking of jurors’ means are based on the means of the transformed responses 
LN(1+Y,) values.
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Table B12 
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance W
137
Group
Mean Response to Questions 
NA B l B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
Jurors 1.67 2.78 2.72 2.47 2.75 3.12 1.96
Bankers 28.11 46.61 32.46 29.61 37.79 52.77 44.16
CPAs 17.87 35.67 25.58 29.53 26.40 38.00 29.24
Rank of Means*
Group NA B l B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
Jurors 1 6 4 3 5 7 2
Bankers I 6 3 2 4 7 5
CPAs 1 6 2 5 3 7 4
w  - 12-------£ [R _ h£ J ) ]2
n W r+ lX r - l ) j ' 1 2
For r =■ 7 and n = 3, operationalization of the above formula produces
W = 0.84127
♦Note that the rankings of jurors’ means are based on the means of the transformed LN(1+Yjvalues.
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Table B13
Rank Correlation Test for Agreement of Multiple Judgements
Mean Response to Questions
Group NA B l B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
Jurors 1.67 2.78 2.72 2.47 2.75 3.12 1.96
Bankers 28.11 46.61 32.46 29.61 37.79 52.77 44.16
CPAs 17.87 35.67 25.58 
Ranks of Means*
29.53 26.40 38.00 29.24
Group NA B l B2 B3 B4 BS B6
Jurors 1 6 4 3 5 7 2
Bankers I 6 3 2 4 7 5
CPAs I 6 2 5 3 7 4
Rj 3.00 18.00 9.00 10.00 12.00 21.00 11.00
Mean Rj 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
Difference -9.00 6.00 -3.00 -2.00 0.00 9.00 -1.00
SS(Differences) 81 36 9 4 0 81 I
r  7 7 7 7 7 7 7
n 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
For r=  7 and n = 3,
Co II A N> 
w w II s SD = Sum o f Squares o f Differences = 212
SDn  = _£  = 70.67 
n
D2 = S-D, = 13.33
2 D,S,2 = —i- = 11.78 
1 r-1
2 0 2  S i * 2 = 0.9524
•in -1)
F* = = 12.37
Tabulated F[0.95;r-l,r(n-l)] == F[0.95;6,14] = 2.85
Since F* = 12.37 > 2.85, conclude that there is agreement between group rankings.
♦Note that the rankings of jurors’ means are based on the means of the transformed responses
LN(1+Yg) values.
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Table BL4
Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables
139
I Information |  J u r o r s |  B ankers I CPAs I Total |
Gender.
male 17 32 21 70
female 30 4 9 43
Total 47 36 30 113
Marital Status:
married 38 31 26 95
not married 9 5 4 18
Total 47 36 30 113
Annual Household 
Income:
less than $65,000 38 12 10 60
$65,000 or more 9 24 20 53
Total 47 36 30 113
Ethnicity:
Caucasian-American 34 30 25 89
other 13 6 5 24
Total 47 36 30 113
Education:
did not complete 
college
37 8 2 47
completed college 10 28 28 66
Total 47 36 30 113
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Table BIS
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables
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I Information I Jurors I Bankers | CPAs | T o t a l |
Years worked:
range 1-50 0 - 3 5 1-40 0 -5 0
average 17.66 17.47 17.63 17.59
Years since completion 
of education:
range 0-60 0 -2 8 3-40 0 -60
average 22.96 14.81 18.33 19.13
Number of accounting and 
auditing courses:
range 0-30 2 -1 2 4-51 0-51
average 2.23 4.83 16.97 6.97
I
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APPENDIX C 
SAS COMPUTER PRINTOUTS
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Table Cl
SAS T Test Procedure for Early vs. Late Banker Respondents
TTEST iPROCEDURE
V a r ia b le :  HA.
TIME H Mean S td  Dev S td  E r r o r Minimum Maximum
1 23
2 34
24.26006957 25.33990276 
30.70588235 30.20087237
5.28373498
5.17940688
0 100.00000000 
0 100.00000000
V a r ia n c e s T DF ProbX TI
U nequal -0  
E qual -0
.8711 52 .4  0.3877 
.8419 55 .0  0.4035
For HO: V a r ia n c e s  a r e  e q u a l,  F* = 1 .42 DF = (3 3 ,2 2 ) Prob>F' = 0 .3926
V a r ia b le :
TIME
Bl
H Mean S td  Dev S td  E r r o r Minimum Maximum
1 23 41.65217391 25.12805150 5.23956094 0 90.00000000
2 34 40.70588235 28.80291380 4.93965896 0 100.00000000
V a ria n c e s T DF ProbX TI
U nequal 0 .1314  51.4 0.8960
Equal 0 .1280  55 .0 0.8986
For HO: V a r ia n c e s  a r e  e q u a l. F ' = 1.31 DF = (3 3 ,2 2 ) Prob>F' = 0 .5083
V a r ia b le :
TIME
B2
N Mean S td  Dev S td  E r r o r  . Minimum Maximum
1 23 44.00000000 28.56571371 5.95636306 0 99.00000000
2 34 36.73529412 28.15574523 4.82867047 0 100.00000000
V a ria n c e s tiia ProbX TI
Unequal 0 .9474  46 .9 0.3483
Equal 0 .9 5 0 1  55 .0 0.3462
For HO: V a r ia n c e s  a r e  e q u a l. F ' = 1 .03 DF = (2 2 ,3 3 ) Prob>F' = 0 . 9205
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table Cl (Continued)
SAS T Test Procedure for Early vs. Late Banker Respondents
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TTEST iPROCEDURE
V a r ia b le : B3
TIME N Mean S td  Dev S td  E r r o r Minimum Maximum
1
2
23 4 0 .52173913 31.47707617 
34 40 .82352941 31.49840841
6 .56342409
5.40193248
0
0
95.00000000
100.00000000
V aria n ces T DF Prob>|TI
Unequal
Equal
-0 .0 3 5 5  47 .4  0.9718 
-0 .0 3 5 5  5 5 .0  0.9718
For HO: V aria n c e s  a r e  e q u a l ,  F ' = 1 .00 DF = (3 3 ,2 2 ) Prob>F' = 1 .0000
V a r ia b le : B4
TIME N Mean S td  Dev S td  E r ro r Minimum Maximum
1
2
23 49.47826087 31.03351497 
34 45 .17647059 32.57854898
6 .47093519
5.58717506
0
0
100.00000000
100.00000000
V aria n ces T DF Prob>1TI
Unequal
Equal
0 .5032  4 8 .9  0.6171 
0 .4984 5 5 .0  0 .6202
For HO: V aria n c e s  a r e  e q u a l ,  F ' = 1 .10 DF = (3 3 ,2 2 ) Prob>F' = 0 .8256
V a r ia b le : BS
TIME N Mean S td  Dev S td  E r r o r Minimum Maximum
1
2
23 30 .86956522 30.69839254 
34 44 .32352941 33.01948056
6.40105733
5 .66279420
0
0
100.00000000
100.00000000
V aria n ces T DF Prob>1TI
Unequal
Equal
-1 .5 7 4 2  4 9 .6  0.1218 
-1 .5 5 1 9  5 5 .0  0.1264
For HO: V a ria n c e s  a r e  e q u a l,  F ' = 1 .16 DF = (3 3 ,2 2 ) Prob>F* = 0 .7316
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Table Cl (Continued)
SAS T Test Procedure for Early vs. Late Banker Respondents
TTEST PROCEDURE
V a r ia b le :  B6 
TIME N
23
34
Mean
34.17391304
37.47058824
S td  Dev
30.18526458
32.59227952
S td  E r ro r
6.29406276
5.58952982
Minimum Maximum
95.00000000
1 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
V a ria n c e s
U nequal
Equal
-0 .3 9 1 6
-0 .3858
DF
49.8
55 .0
Prob>ITI
0 .6970
0 .7011
For HO: V aria n ces  a r e  e q u a l ,  F* = 1 .17 DF = (33 ,22) P rob> F ' = 0 .7171
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Table C2
SAS T Test Procedure for Early vs. Late CPAs Respondents
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V a r ia b le :
TIME
NA
N Mean
TTEST 
S td  Dev
PROCEDURE
S td  E rro r Minimum Maximum
1 21 25.23809524 34.09238150 7.43956756 0 100.00000000
2 24 11.41666667 16.20766503 3.30837577 0 58.00000000
V a r ia n c e s T DF P rob>1TI
Unequal 1 .6975 27.7 0 .1008
E qual 1 .7724  43.0 0 .0834
For HO: V a ria n c e s  a r e  eq u a l. F* = 4 .4 2 DF = (20 ,23) Prob>F' = 0 .0009
V a r ia b le :
TIME
Bl
N Mean S td  Dev S td  E rro r Minimum Maximum
1 21 29.09523810 36.01930699 7.86005718 0 100.00000000
2 24 22.91666667 18.93447894 3.864 98433 0 75.00000000
V a r ia n c e s tua P rob> 1T 1
U nequal 0 .7054 29.3 0 .4861
Equal 0 .7333 43.0 0 .4674
For HO: V a ria n c e s  a r e  eq u a l. F ' -  3 .62 DF = (20 ,23) Prob>F’ = 0 .0038
V a r ia b le :
TIME
B2
N Mean S td  Dev S td  E rro r Minimum Maximum
1 21 40.71428571 39.00787466 8.51221611 0 100.00000000
2 24 27.00000000 24.13188401 4.92590020 0 95.00000000
V a r ia n c e s  T DF Prob>lTI
U nequal 1 .3945  32.5 0 .1726
Equal 1 .4376  43.0 0 .1578
For HO: V a r ia n c e s  a r e  e q u a l, F ' = 2 .61  DF = (20 ,23) Prob>F* = 0 .0 2 8 6
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Table C2 (Continued)
SAS T Test Procedure for Early vs. Late CPAs Respondents
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TTEST 1PROCEDURE
V a r ia b le : B3
TIME N Mean S td  Dev S td  E r r o r Minimum Maximum
1 21 41.57142857 37.44138276 8.17037955 0 100.00000000
2 24 26.83333333 26.77225473 5.46486361 0 75.00000000
V a ria n c e s T DF P rob> |T |
U nequal 1 .4994 3 5 .7 0.1426
E qual 1 .5328 4 3 .0 0 .1326
F or HO: V arian ces a r e  e q u a l . F ' = 1 .9 6 DF = (20 ,23 ) Prob>F ' «* 0. 1232
V a r ia b le : B4
TIME N Mean S td  Dev S td  E rro r Minimum Maximum
1 21 33.95238095 33.51936185 7.31452443 0 100.00000000
2 24 27.29166667 29.41380801 6.00406842 0 90.00000000
V a ria n c e s tii 1 
O 
1111111
H 
11111 P rob> 1T 1
Unequal 0 .7039 4 0 .2 0 .4856
E qual 0 .7101 4 3 .0 0.4815
F or HO: V arian ces  a r e  e q u a l . II I-* U) o DF = (20 ,23) Prob>F* = 0 . 5429
V a r ia b le : B5
TIME N Mean S td  Dev S td  E rro r Minimum Maximum
1 21 32.52380952 40.28972456 8.79193869 0 100.00000000
2 24 27.83333333 29.34897475 5.99083438 0 99.00000000
V a ria n c e s T DF P rob> 1T 1
U nequal 0 .4409 3 6 .1 0.6619
Equal 0 .4502 4 3 .0 0.6548
F or HO: V arian ces a r e  e q u a l . F ' = 1 .8 8 DF = (20 ,23) Prob>F ' = 0 . 1450
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Table C l (Continued)
SAS T Test Procedure for Early vs. Late CPAs Respondents
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TTEST PROCEDURE
V a r ia b le :  B6
TIME N Mean S td  Dev S td  E r r o r  Minimum Maximum
21
24
37.80952381
25.20833333
38.13871923
25.30677718
8.32255085
5.16572426
100.00000000
75 .00000000
V a r ia n c e s DE Prob> |T I
U nequal
Equal
1.2864
1.3210
34.0
43.0
0 .2070
0 .1935
For HO: V a r ia n c e s  a r e  e q u a l, F ' = 2 .2 7 DF = (20 ,23 ) Prob>F* = 0 .0 6 0 5
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Table O
SAS ANOVA Table for Jurors
G eneral L in e a r  M odels P ro c ed u re  
C la s s  L evel In fo rm a tio n
C la s s  L ev e ls  
SUBJECT 67
QUESTION 7
V alu es
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
67
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number o f  o b s e rv a t io n s  i n  d a ta  s e t  = 469
G eneral L in e a r  M odels P ro ced u re
D ependent V a r ia b le :  PERCENT
S ource DF Sum o f  S quares Mean S quare F V alue P r > F
Model 72 192060.08528785 2667.50118455 6.17 0 .0001
E rro r 396 171302.56716418 432.58224031
C o rre c te d T o ta l  468 363362.65245203
R-Square C.V. Root MSE PERCENT Mean
0.528563 73.32593 20.79861150 28 .36460554
S ource DF Type I  SS Mean S quare F V alue P r > F
QUESTION
SUBJECT
6
66
34892.86140725
157167.22388060
5815.47690121
2381.32157395
13.44
5 .50
0 .0001
0 .0001
S ource DF Type I I I  SS Mean S quare F V alue Pr > F
QUESTION
SUBJECT
6
66
34892.86140725
157167.22388060
5815.47690121
2381.32157395
13.44
5 .50
0 .0001
0 .0001
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Table C4
SAS ANOVA Table for the Bankers
G en e ra l L in e a r  M odels P rocedure 
C la s s  L evel In fo rm a tio n
C la s s  L e v e ls V alues
BANKER 57 1 2 3 4 5 6 
25 26 27 28 
46 47 48 49
7 8 9 10 11 12 
29 30 31 32 33 
50 51 52 53 54
13
34
55
14 15 16 17 18 
35 36 37 38 39 
56 57
19 20 21 22 
40 41 42 43
23 24 
44 45
QUESTION 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number o f  o b s e rv a t io n s  :Ln 'd a ta  s e t  = 3 9 9
G enera l L in e a r  Models P rocedure
D ependent V a r ia b le :  PERCENT
S ource DE Sum o f  S q u ares Mean S quare F V alue Pr > F
Model 62 172728.4561404 2785.9428410 4 .80 0 .0001
E rro r 336 194856.4360902 579.9298693
C o rre c te d T o ta l 398 367584.8922306
R-Square C.V. Root MSE PERCENT Mean
0.469901 62.08718 24.08173310 38 . 78696742
S ource DF Type I  SS Mean S quare F V alue Pr > F
QUESTION
BANKER
6
56
29925.2781955
142803.1779449
4987.5463659
2550.0567490
8 .6 0
4 .4 0
0 .0001
0 .0001
S ource DF Type I I I  SS Mean S quare F V alue Pr > F
QUESTION
BANKER
6
56
29925.2781955
142803.1779449
4987.5463659
2550.0567490
8 .60  
4 .40
0.0001
0 .0001
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Table C5
SAS ANOVA Table for the CPAs
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G en era l L in e a r  M odels P rocedure  
C la ss  L eve l In fo rm a tio n
C la s s  L e v e ls  V alues
CPA 45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
QUESTION 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number o f  o b s e rv a t io n s  in  d a ta  s e t  = 315
G enera l L in e a r  M odels P rocedu re  
D ependent V a r ia b le :  PERCENT
S ource DE Sum o f  S quares Mean S quare E V alue Pr > E
Model 50 187885.8666667 3757.7173333 8 .2 5 0.0001
E rro r 264 120276.8825397 455.5942520
C o rre c te d  T o ta l 314 308162.74 92063
R -Square C.V. Root MSE PERCENT Mean
0.609697 73.86099 21.34465395 28 .89841270
S ource DE Type I  SS Mean Square E V alue Pr > E
QUESTION 6 12066.2603175 2011.0433862 4 .4 1 0 .0003
CPA 44 175819.6063492 3995.9001443 8 .7 7 0 .0001
S ource DE Type I I I  SS Mean Square E V alue Pr > E
QUESTION 6 12066.2603175 2011.0433862 4 .4 1 0 .0003
CPA 44 175819.6063492 3995.9001443 8 .7 7 0 .0001
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Table C6
SAS ANOVA Table for the Jurors Transformed as LN(1+Y*)
G enera l L in e a r  M odels P ro ced u re  
C la ss  L evel I n fo rm a tio n
V alues
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
67
Number o f  o b s e rv a t io n s  i n  d a t a  s e t  = 469
G enera l L in e a r  M odels P ro ced u re
D ependent V a r ia b le :  LN
S ource DF Sum o f  S q u a res Mean Square F V alue P r > F
Model 72 752.90412044 10.45700167 7 .6 1 0 .0001
E rro r 396 544.42399116 1.37480806
C o rre c te d  T o ta l 468 1297.32811160
R -Square C.V. Root MSE LN Mean
0.580350 47.00467 1.17252209 2.49447974
S ource DF Type I  SS Mean Square F V alue P r > F
QUESTION 6 103.74720934 17.29120156 12.58 0 .0 0 0 1
JUROR 66 649.15691110 9.83571077 7 .1 5 0 .0001
S ource DF Type I I I  SS Mean Square F V alue Pr > F
QUESTION 6 103.74720934 17.29120156 12 .58 0 .0001
JUROR 66 649.15691110 9.83571077 7 .1 5 0 .0001
C la s s  L e v e ls  
QUESTION 7
JUROR 67
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Table C7
SAS ANOVA Tables for Continuous Variables
Model: MODEL1
Dependent V a r ia b le :  YRSEMPL
A n a ly s is  o f  V a ria n c e  P ro ced u re
Source DF
Model 2
E rro r  110
C o rre c te d  T o ta l  112
R -S quare
0 .000062
Sum o f  S quares
0.78225590
12708.49208038
12709.27433628
C.V.
61.09599
Mean S quare  F V alue P r > F
0.39112795 0 .0 0  0 .9 9 6 6
115.53174619
Root MSE 
10.74856949
YRSEMPL Mean 
17 .59292035
Source
GROUPS
DF
2
Anova SS 
0.78225590
Mean S quare  F V alue P r > F
0.39112795 0 .0 0  0 .9 9 6 6
Dependent V a r ia b le :  YRSED
A n a ly s is  o f  V a ria n c e  P ro ced u re
Source DF
Model 2
E rro r  110
C o rrec ted  T o ta l  112
R -S quare
0 .079051
Sum o f  S q u ares
1380.78840038
16086.22044917
17467.00884956
C.V.
63.20529
Mean S quare  F V alue P r > F
690.39420019 4 .72  0 .0 1 0 8
146.23836772
Root MSE 
12.09290568
YRSED Mean 
19 .13274336
Source
GROUPS
DF
2
Anova SS
1380.78840038
Mean S quare  F V alue P r > F
690.39420019 4 .72  0 .0 1 0 8
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Table C7 (Continued) 
SAS ANOVA Tables for Continuous Variables
D ependent
S ource
Model
E r r o r
C o r re c te d
S ource
GROUPS
V a r ia b le :  COURSES
A n a ly s is  o f  V aria n ce  P ro c ed u re
DF Sum o f  S q u ares  Mean S q u a re  F V alue
2 4216.52815540 2108.26407770 42.44
110 5464.39219858 49.67629271
T o ta l  112 9680.92035398
R-Square C.V. Root MSE
0.435550 101.0711 7 .04814108
DF Anova SS Mean S q u a re  F V alue
2 4216.52815540 2108.26407770 42.44
P r > F 
0.0001
COURSES Mean 
6 .97345133
Pr > F 
0 . 0 0 0 1
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Table C8
SAS ANOVA Tables for the Seven Multiple Regression Models
G en era l L in e a r M odels P rocedure
Number o f  o b s e rv a t io n s  in d a ta  s e t  = 113
D ependent V a r ia b le :  NA
S ource DF Sum o f  S q u ares Mean Square F V alue P r > F
Model 10 12671.16185030 1267 .11618503 2 .6 1  0 .0072
E rro r 102 49465.95319394 484 .96032543
C o rre c te d  T o ta l 112 62137.11504425
R -Square C.V. Root MSE NA Mean
0.203923 122.9479 22 .02181476 17.91150442
T f o r HO: Pr > 1TI S td  E r r o r  o f
P aram e te r E s tim a te  Param eter=0 E s tim a te
INTERCEPT 30.41496881 3 .10 0.0025 9 .80894209
JURY 2.32069985 0 .29 0.7725 8.00467014
BANKERS 15.04016299 2 .18 0.0315 6.89710993
MALE 5.86711049 1.11 0.2686 5-27495514
MARRIED -5.59214075 -0 .9 3 0.3534 5 .99819696
LT65 -7.62255283 -1 .5 2 0 .1326 5 .02824966
CA -9.78035863 -1 .8 8 0.0627 5.19627923
LT4YR -3.44179803 -0 .6 1 0.5459 5 .67940142
YRSEMPL -0.35980591 -1 .4 8 0.1423 0.24334875
COURSES -0.16821543 -0 .5 5 0.5839 0 .30612950
YRSED 0.16623773 0 .7 6 0 .4506 0 .2194 9721
i
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Table C8 (Continued)
SAS ANOVA Tables for the Seven Multiple Regression Models
G en e ra l L in e ar M odels P ro c ed u re
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B l
S ource DE* Sum o f  S quares Mean S quare E V alue P r > P
Model 10 14759. 13570970 1475 .91357097 1 .98  0 .0 4 2 6
E r r o r 102 75875. 14747614 743 .87399486
C o rre c te d  T o ta l 112 90634. 28318584
R -S quare C.V. Root MSE Bl Mean
0 .162843 82.84860 27 .27405351 32.92035398
T f o r HO: Pr > |TI S td  E r ro r  o f
P a ram e te r E s tim a te P aram eter=0 E s tim a te
INTERCEPT 26.07451113 2 .1 5 0.0342 12.14839079
JURY 11.61474314 1 .17 0.2441 9.91379702
BANKERS 24.26033179 2 .84 0.0054 8.54208190
MALE 0.27839445 0 .04 0.9661 6.53304055
MARRIED -0 .26273606 -0.04 0 .9719 7 .42877673
LT65 -7 .75358126 -1 .25 0 .2160 6.22749541
CA -4 .99888613 -0 .78 0 .4391 6.43560031
LT4YR 13.27398654 1 .8 9 0 .0620 7.03394792
YRSEMPL -0 .11926094 -0 .40 0 .6931 0.30138782
COURSES 0.25617243 0 .6 8 0.5008 0.37914189
YRSED -0.10190044 -0.37 0 .7086 0 .27184765
.i
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Table C8 (Continued)
SAS ANOVA Tables for the Seven Multiple Regression Models
G e n e ra l L in e a r  M odels P rocedure
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B2
S o u rce DE Sum o f  S q u ares  Mean S quare E V alue Pr > E
Model 10 9596. 72940448 959 .67294045 1 .1 3  0.3441
E r r o r 102 86256. 95201145 845 .65639227
C o r re c te d T o ta l  112 95853. 68141593
R -Square C.V. Root MSE B2 Mean
0.100119 93.64661 29 .08017181 31.05309735
T f o r  HO: Pr > |TI S td  E r ro r  o f
P a ra m e te r E s tim a te Param eter=0 E s tim a te
INTERCEPT 13.38776990 1.03 0 .3038 12.95287080
JURY 13.09430999 1.24 0 .2183 10.57029974
BANKERS 25.57500866 2.81 0 .0060 9.10774810
MALE -7 .61371199 -1 .0 9 0 .2770 6.96566579
MARRIED -0 .73465255 -0 .0 9 0 .9263 7.92071862
LT65 -4 .14122196 -0 .6 2 0 .5342 6.63988711
CA 5.69948652 0.83 0 .4081 6.86177295
LT4YR 3.71147256 0.49 0.6217 7.49974381
YRSEMPL 0.13357670 0.42 0 .6785 0.32134606
COURSES 0.66284250 1.64 0 .1042 0.40424909
YRSED -0 .06139642 -0 .2 1 0 .8327 0.28984970
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G eneral L in e a r  M odels P rocedure
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B3
S ource DF Sum o f  S q u a res Mean S quare F V alue  P r > F
Model 10 12793.23310331 1279.32331033 1 .3 2  0 .2313
E r r o r 102 990S4.69610023 971.22251079
C o rre c te d T o ta l  112 111857.92920354
R-Square C.V. Root MSE B3 Mean
0.114370 91.39844 31.16444305 34.09734513
P aram e te r E stim ate
INTERCEPT 5.57824285
JURY 25.23108529
BANKERS 26.38681160
MALE 3.52519787
MARRIED 6.23642747
LT65 -9.15617670
CA 3.99779269
LT4YR -1.93605563
YRSEMPL -0.11712536
COURSES 0.81253262
YRSED 0.04631564
T f o r  HO: Pr > 1TI S td  E r r o r  o f
P aram eter=0 E s tim a te
0 .40 0.6886 13.88124551
2 .23 0.0281 1 1 .327  90777
2 .70 0.0080 9.76053027
0.47 0.6378 7 .46491790
0 .73 0.4642 8.48842249
-1 .2 9 0.2011 7 .11578959
0.54 0.5879 7.35357871
-0 .2 4 0.8101 8.03727504
-0 .3 4 0.7345 0 .34437798
1.88 0.0636 0 .43322295
0 .15 0.8818 0 .31062418
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table C8 (Continued)
SAS ANOVA Tables for the Seven Multiple Regression Models
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G en era l L in e a r  M odels P ro ced u re
Dependent: V a r ia b le :  B4
S ource DF Sum o f  S q u a res Mean Square F V alue P r > F
Model 10 13916.62698133 1391.66269813 1.53  0 .1379
E rro r 102 92517.53231070 907.03463050
C o r re c te d T o ta l  112 106434.15929204
R-Square C.V. Root MSE B4 Mean
0.130753 92.12839 30.11701563 32.6902654 9
T f o r  HO: Pr > ITI S td  E r r o r  o f
P a ra m e te r E s tim a te Param eter= 0 E s tim a te
INTERCEPT 29.07293030 2.17 0.0325 13.41470108
JURY 5.64522541 0 .52 0.6072 10.94718025
BANKERS 24.94171692 2.64 0.0095 9.43248182
MALE -6.53740180 -0 .9 1 0.3670 7.21402428
MARRIED 6.82693199 0.83 0.4072 8.20312920
LT65 -9.36659059 -1 .3 6 0.1762 6.87663007
CA -7.32937785 -1 .0 3 0.3048 7.10642718
LT4YR 3.85016593 0 .50 0.6212 7.76714468
YRSEMPL -0.16467769 -0 .4 9 0.6218 0.33280355
COURSES 0.29333123 0 .70 0.4851 0.41866246
YRSED 0.09510283 0 .32 0.7520 0.30018420
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Table C8 (Continued)
SAS ANOVA Tables for the Seven Multiple Regression Models
G e n e ra l L in e a r  M odels P ro ced u re
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B5
S ource DF Sum o f  S quares Mean S quare F Value Pr > F
Model 10 7227. 10171322 722 .71017132 0 .6 6  0 .7605
E rro r 102 112037. 28766731 1098 .40478105
C o rre c te d T o ta l  112 119264. 38938053
R -S quare C.V. Root MSE B5 Mean
0.060597 96.42295 33 .14219035 34.37168142
T fo r HO: P r > 1TI S td  E rro r  o f
P aram e te r E s tim a te Param eter=0 E stim a te
INTERCEPT 20.17083065 1.37 0.1748 14.76217240
JURY 14.27605436 1 .19 0 .2388 12.04679561
BANKERS 20.17620464 1.94 0 .0547 10.37994972
MALE -6 .25865662 -0 .7 9 0 .4323 7.93865398
MARRIED 5.99015592 0 .66 0 .5085 9.02711188
LT65 -5 .6 5 4  90343 -0 .7 5 0 .4566 7.56736941
CA -2 .79854295 -0 .3 6 0 .7212 7.82024 903
LT4YR 6.09509342 0.71 0.4774 8.54733386
YRSEMPL 0.07631754 0 .21 0 .8353 0.36623278
COURSES 0.44433206 0 .96 0 .3371 0.46071599
YRSED -0 .03720286 -0 .1 1 0 .9106 0.33033691
!
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G en e ra l L in e a r  Models P ro ced u re
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B6
S ource DF Sum o£ S quares Mean S quare F V alue P r > F
Model 10 6951. 88656312 695 .18865631 0 .7 2  0 .7051
E r r o r 102 98651. 97184396 967 .17619455
C o rre c te d T o ta l  112 105603. 85840708
R -Square C.V. R oot MSE B6 Mean
0.065830 86.30252 31 .09945650 36.03539823
T fo r HO: P r > ITI S td  E rro r  o f
P aram e te r E s tim a te Param eter=0 E stim a te
INTERCEPT 18.47145725 1.33 0.1854 13.85229924
JURY 15.38070600 1 .36 0 .1766 11.30428593
BANKERS 19.29625033 1.98 0 .0503 9.74017684
MALE -4 .13597301 -0 .56 0 .5800 7.44935146
MARRIED 7.06717505 0 .83 0 .4061 8.47072176
LT65 0.29299457 0.04 0 .9672 7.10095119
CA -0 .42501520 -0 .06 0 .9539 7.33824445
LT4YR 2.99777584 0.37 0 .7094 8.02051508
YRSEMPL 0.13435397 0.39 0 .6966 0.34365986
COURSES 0.61228103 1.42 0 .1597 0.43231956
YRSED -0.30557035 -0.99 0 .3266 0.30997644
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Table C9 
SAS ANOVA Table Of The Reduced Version For Model B3
M odel: M0DEL2 
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B3
A n a ly s is  o f  V arian ce
Source DF
Sum o f  
S q u ares
Mean
Square F V alue
Model 9 12778.29192 1419.81021 1 .476
E rro r 103 99079.63728 961.93823
C T o ta l 112 111857.92920
Root MSE 31.01513 R -sq u a re 0.1142
Dep Mean 34.09735 Adj R -sq 0.0368
C.V. 90.96054
P aram e te r  E s tim a te s
P aram eter S ta n d a rd T f o r  HO:
V a r ia b le DF E s tim a te E r ro r Param eter=0 Prob > 1T 1
INTERCEP 1 5.626562 13.80929671 0.407 0.6845
JB 1 26.028937 9.27963335 2.805 0 .0060
MALE 1 3.879626 6.86328885 0 .565 0.5731
MARRIED 1 6.088674 8.36415013 0.728 0.4683
LT65 1 -9.439094 6.70799454 -1 .4 0 7 0.1624
CA 1 4.033144 7.31284740 0.552 0.5825
LT4YR 1 -2 .194058 7.72623341 -0 .2 8 4 0.7770
YRSEMPL 1 -0 .117803 0.34268488 -0 .3 4 4 0.7317
COURSES 1 0.816734 0.42982754 1.900 0.0602
YRSED 1 0.037433 0.30080766 0.124 0.9012
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B3
T e s t :  TEST1 N um erator: 14 .9412 DF: 1 F v a lu e :  0.0154
D enom inator: 971.2225 DF: 102 Prob>F: 0 .9015
Prob>F
0.1667
Type I I  SS
159.694614
7568.301057
307.370577
509.740303
1904.681528
292.591424
77.572518
113.676374
3473.118994
14.896327
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M o d e l :  M O D E L 1
D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e :  N A  ( L N e 1 , )
S ource
Model 
E r r o r  
C T o ta l
Root MSE 
□ep Mean 
C.V.
A n a ly s is  o f  V ariance
DF
Sum o f  
S q u ares
Mean
Square
3 784559.36686 261519.78895 
109 68044466.129 624261.15714 
112 68829025.495
790.10199
437.75180
180.49086
R -sq u a re  
Adj R-sq
F V alue 
0 .4 1 9
Prob>F
0.7398
0.0114
-0 .0 1 5 8
P aram e te r  E s tim a te s
P aram eter S tan d a rd T f o r  HO:
V a r ia b le DF E stim a te E rro r Param eter=0 Prob > |TI
INTERCEP 1 582.210916 164.08898819 3.548 0 .0006
YRSEMPL 1 -7.634134 8.34229670 -0 .9 1 5 0 .3622
COURSES 1 -2 .411396 8.08694056 -0 .2 9 8 0.7661
YRSED 1 0.348269 7.10897998 0.049 0 .9610
M odel: MODEL1
D ependent V a r ia b le :  Bl (LNe1,)
S ource
Model 
E r ro r  
C T o ta l
Root MSE 
Dep Mean 
C.V.
A n a ly s is  o f  V ariance
DF
Sum o f  
S q u a res
Mean
S quare
3 253940.77341 84646.92447
109 76557824.637 702365.36364 
112 76811765.41
838.07241
671.46148
124.81318
R -square  
Adj R -sq
F V alue 
0.121
Prob>F
0.9479
0.0033
-0 .0 2 4 1
P aram e te r  E s tim a te s
P aram eter S ta n d a rd T f o r  HO:
V a r ia b le DF E stim a te E rro r Param eter=0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 578.999097 174.05152141 3.327 0 .0012
YRSEMPL 1 1.804513 8.84879265 0.204 0 .8388
COURSES 1 2.217317 8.57793276 0.258 0 .7965
YRSED 1 2.365232 7.54059608 0.314 0.7544
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M o d e l :  M O D E L 1
D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e :  B 2  C L N e 1 , )
S o u rce
Model 
E r r o r  
C T o ta l
Root MSE 
Dep Mean 
C.V.
A n a ly s is  o f  V arian ce
DF
Sum o f  
S quares
Mean
S quare
3 5788764.8992 1929588.2997 
109 96430540.202 884683.85507 
112 102219305.1
940.57634
763.33586
123.21920
R -sq u are  
Adj R -sq
P aram eter E s tim a te s
F V alue 
2 .181
Prob>F
0.0944
0 .0 5 6 6
0 .0307
P aram eter S tan d a rd T f o r  HO:
V a r ia b le DF E stim a te E rro r P aram eter= 0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 498.451724 195.33961679 2 .552 0.0121
YRSEMPL 1 10.980422 9.93108105 1 .106 0.2713
COURSES 1 20.919417 9.62709251 2 .173 0.0319
YRSED 1 -3.876814 8.46288006 -0 .4 5 8 0.6478
M odel: MODEL1
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B3 (LNe*j)
A n a ly s is  o f  V aria n ce
S o u rce
Model 
E r r o r  
C T o ta l
DF
Sum o f  
S quares
Mean
S quare
3 1629341.9157 543113.9719
109 122413396.68 1123058.6852 
112 124042738.6
F V alue 
0 .484
Prob>F
0.6944
Root MSE 1059.74463 R -sq u are  0 .0131
Dep Mean 876.67873 Adj R -sq -0 .0 1 4 0
C.V. 120.88176
P aram eter E s tim a te s
P aram eter S tan d a rd T f o r  HO:
V a r ia b le DF E stim a te E rro r P aram eter= 0 Prob > |TI
INTERCEP 1 790.697443 220.08857876 3 .5 9 3 0.0005
YRSEMPL 1 -2 .859569 11.18932016 -0 .2 5 6 0.7988
COURSES 1 12.964157 10.84681717 1 .1 9 5 0.2346
YRSED 1 2.398221 9.53510237 0 .2 5 2 0.8019
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Table CIO (Continued)
Estimation of Model (3.8) for Behavioral Scenarios
M o d e l :  M O D E L !
D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e :  B 4
Source
(LNe*,)
Model 
E rro r  
C T o ta l
Root MSE 
Dep Mean 
C.V.
A n a ly s is  o f  V arian ce
DF
Sum o f  
S quares
Mean
S quare
3 4467317.5279 1489105.8426 
109 116021542.16 1064417.818
112 120488859.69
1031.70627
818.73922
126.01158
R -square  
Adj R -sq
F V alue 
1 .399
Prob>F
0.2471
0 .0371
0 .0 1 0 6
P aram ete r E s tim a te s
P a ra m e te r S tan d a rd T f o r  HO:
V a r ia b le DF E s tim a te E rro r P aram eter= 0 Prob > IT I
INTERCEP 1 835.522258 214.26554 924 3 .8 9 9 0 .0002
YRSEMPL 1 -1 4 .7 9 4 7 6 2 10.89327690 -1 .3 5 8 0 .1772
COURSES 1 17.588641 10.55983573 1 .6 6 6 0.0987
YRSED 1 6.316214 9.28282584 0 .6 8 0 0.4977
M odel: MODEL1
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B5 (LNe*,)
Source
Model 
E rro r  
C T o ta l
Root MSE 
Dep Mean 
C.V.
A n a ly s is  o f  V arian ce
DF
Sum o f  
S quares
Mean
Square
3 9623119.5897 3207706.5299 
109 124010327.24 1137709.4242 
112 133633446.83
1066.63463
991.48042
107.58000
R -square  
Adj R -sq
F V alue 
2 .819
0 .0720
0 .0465
Prob>F
0.0424
P aram ete r E s tim a te s
P a ra m e te r S tan d a rd T f o r  HO:
V a ria b le DF E s tim a te E rro r Pararoeter=0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 693.720771 221.51949788 3 .1 3 2 0 .0022
YRSEMPL 1 1.581228 11.26206820 0 .1 4 0 0 .8886
COURSES 1 31.205303 10.91733840 2 .858 0.0051
YRSED 1 2 .735236 9.59709541 0 .2 8 5 0.7762
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M odel: MODEL!
D ependent V a r ia b le :  B6 (LNe1,)
S ource
Model 
E rro r  
C T o ta l
Root MSE 
Dep Mean 
C.V.
A n a ly s is  o f  V a ria n c e
DE
Sum o f  
S quares
Mean
S quare
3 2213216.9088 737738.96962 
109 103860899.07 952852.28507 
112 106074115.98
976.14153
873.02630
111.81124
R -sq u a re  
Adj R -sq
F Value 
0.774
Prob>F
0.5108
0.0209
-0 .0061
P aram eter E s tim a te s
V a r ia b le DF
P aram eter
E stim ate
S ta n d a rd
E r r o r
T f o r  HO: 
Param eter=0 Prob > 1TI
INTERCEP 1 695.364734 202.72582218 3.430 0.0009
YRSEMPL 1 -1.032805 10.30659629 -0 .1 0 0 0.9204
COURSES 1 14.176862 9.99111331 1.419 0.1588
YRSED 1 5.068273 8.78287951 0.577 0.5651
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